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Abstract 
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Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to through the analysis of interviews 
with finance professionals in listed companies answer the 
question on what lies behind capital structure decisions, and to 
see how well the prevailing theories fit the answers.  
 
 
Methodology: This article is an explorative and descriptive hypothesis creating 
study. We have used a qualitative method to analyse practice 
through theory. We have conducted telephone interviews with 
CFO:s and financial executives in Swedish listed companies on 
how they reason when they make capital structure decisions. We 
have then thoroughly reviewed the theory and empirical tests of 
the theories. Through the five theoretical perspectives; Trade-
Off, Pecking-Order, Market Timing, Signalling and Product-
Market Competition, we have ana lysed the answers. After that, 
we have created hypotheses that answer our purpose.  
 
 
Conclusions: Our conclusions come in the form of hypotheses. There are eight 
hypotheses and a number of sub-hypotheses. In short, we 
essentially find that the theories on capital structure are too 
normative, and do not fit practice. We also find that companies 
mainly consider flexibility, covenants, cash-flow, credit rating, 
interest rates and strategy when making capital structure 
decisions. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this first chapter we give an introduction to the subject and state the purpose of 
our thesis. Further we discuss our contribution, the limitations of the study and its 
applicability.  
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
No area of corporate finance has been debated, discussed, argued over and studied 
as much as capital structure. How firms determine the amount of debt it should 
have, or how to finance a new project, is something that researchers have 
occupied themselves with for nearly fifty years. The discussion took its start in the 
now almost legendary 1958 article by Modigliani and Miller, where they 
presented their proposition that in perfect markets, firm value is irrelevant to its 
capital structure. We now of course know that the markets are not perfect, but the 
irrelevance proposition is still today the starting point for almost all research into 
capital structure. When an area is studied as thoroughly and for as long time as 
capital structure has been, many competing and complementing theories will 
inevitably be conceived, and also in this case. Each of them offers plausible 
explanations and justifications of what determines the capital structure choice, and 
what an optimal capital structure is. As one study these theories, one can not help 
but to conclude that no theory seems to be wrong, but no one explains the whole 
picture, there is no complete theory. Every theory explains some part of the 
capital structure choice, some more and some less, but no one seems to cover the 
entire choice. We do not contend that several theories can exist alongside each 
other on the same subject; we do however think that there is room for 
improvement or at least synthesising of some of the theories, at least by the ones 
that do not contradict each other. Setting out to examine this, we read several 
studies on capital structure choice. But the more we read, the more we realised 
what was missing, at least what we were missing.  
 
Numerous studies and theories have seen the light of day since Modigliani and 
Miller’s “The cost of capital, corporation finance, and the theory of investment” 
was published in 1958. When reading articles and studying the area, we found that 
there are many articles discussing the theories, and there are even more testing 
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them, but most of the test are regressions with secondary data of past actions. 
Some of the more important include Robicheck and Meyers (1966), Leland and 
Pyle (1977), Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984), Harris 
and Raviv (1991), Opler and Titman (1994), Bagley et al (1998), Ghosh and Cai 
(1999) and Baker and Wurgler (2002). Although very interesting and extremely 
important to form the groundwork for deeper analyses, we wanted to know more 
about the actual decisions, not only the actions. We then found a small number of 
articles with empirical research into factors that influence managers when they 
make capital structure decisions. These included Graham and Harvey (2001) and 
Brouen et al (2005). These two surveys are basically done the same way, that is, 
the latter build on the former, but have a European setting where the former is 
strictly American. It is especially from the former that we have been inspired to 
perform this study, but unlike Brouen et al (2005), we do not copy the survey, we 
just use the findings as a basis for our interviews. None of these had however used 
interviews to question practitioners, but rather questionnaires. Some of these were 
admittedly very detailed, but we felt that none of them came close enough to truly 
establishing how a manager thought when making decisions, and why the factor 
that they considered was important. To know this, a study with a moderate 
number of personal interviews has to be made, and that is where this thesis is 
positioned. To be able to do this, a rather thorough review of capital structure 
theories and recent tests has to be done, and that is an added way of looking at 
part o our thesis, as clarification of the current status. 
 
What we want to do is to take a closer look into what lies behind capital structure 
decisions, how managers think before they make any decision regarding their 
companies’ capital structure. We then want to create some hypotheses for future 
testing and examination. From this discussion, the questions we will try to answer 
are: what are the most important factors that managers consider when making 
capital structure decisions; how does a manager reason when making capital 
structure decisions, that is, what is the underlying rationale behind the factors 
that they state as important ; and how well do the major theories on capital 
structure fit these factors? 
 
Our overarching goal is to clarify and simplify competing capital structure 
theories, with the aim of examining their fit on reasoning behind capital structure 
decisions in firms. We will answer these questions by starting with a thorough 
examination of the literature that builds and tests theories regarding capital 
structure. We will then perform deep open interviews with representatives from 
Swedish listed companies. We have chosen to work with finance professionals 
high up in the hierarchy, as it is their thinking we wish to examine and analyse. 
These professionals and the choice of companies will be presented later in this 
paper. From these interviews, we will apply different perspectives and analyse 
them from the various theories that we have accounted for in the theory part of the 
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thesis. The ultimate goal is then to through a discussion of the analyses find 
common patterns than can shed a light on the reasoning behind capital structure 
decisions by answering the questions stated above. 
 
 
 
1.2 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to through the analysis of interviews with finance 
professionals in listed companies answer the question on what lies behind capital 
structure decisions, and to see how well the prevailing theories fit the answers.  
 
 
1.3 Limitations 
 
In our discussion and statement of the prevailing theories we use authors and 
empirical tests from all over the world, be it mostly from the United States and 
Europe. The empirical part of our thesis, that is, the interviews and following 
discussion and analysis, is strictly done from a Swedish perspective, with Swedish 
representatives from firms listed on the Stockholm stock exchange. We are 
furthermore interested first and foremost in the reasoning behind the capital 
structure decisions, and not the actual actions, and will therefore not perform any 
investigations into if firms actually act in line with their reasoning. Since we focus 
on reasoning, we have not distinguished between firm size, profitability, industry, 
age or business cycle, something that is otherwise often done in analysis of capital 
structures in practice. Finally, we will not discuss the eventuality of gender 
differences in the answers, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, this is not an aspect we 
included when choosing respondents, and secondly because there is a clear 
majority of men in financial executive positions in Swedish listed companies. 
Although very interesting, sad and extremely thought provoking, this is a 
discussion and a topic for another thesis. 
 
 
1.4 Contribution 
 
We consider our main contribution to be threefold. Firstly, we will contribute by 
offering a current and up to date picture of where capital structure theory is today, 
which tests have been made and what the recent empery says about the field. 
Secondly, we will provide a deeper look into the minds of practitioners in the 
field, what the ones who daily make capital structure decisions think and consider 
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before making these decisions. Thirdly, we will hopefully provide some 
interesting hypotheses regarding the development of the theories on capital 
structure, and maybe bring forth some ideas on how to approach some sort of 
reconciliation of the sometimes contradictory theories on capital structure. This 
said, we do of course not aspire on being able to completely refute or discard of 
theories, or creating some new revolutionary theory that perfectly explain 
everything surrounding capital structure decision making. We do however hope to 
come to some conclusions and hypotheses that are interesting enough to be more 
closely examined and tested in future research. 
 
 
1.5 The Study’s General Applicability 
 
The general applicability of our findings will be limited by various factors. First 
and foremost, the interviews are performed with a limited number of respondents 
in a limited time in a very limited geographical area in a small corner of the 
world. This alone makes the general applicability rather limited. We do however 
feel that the number of respondents is large enough to be able to generalise the 
answers to apply to large listed companies in Sweden or similar countries, or at 
least serve as a general idea of what are important factors and how capital 
structure decisions are made in Sweden or similar countries, with the special 
conditions that comes from being a large company in a rather small economy, and 
sometimes being forced to look abroad for financing because of the limited 
amount of capital domestically. It is however not our idea with this thesis that it 
should be able to be widely generalised. We want to arrive in and provide 
hypotheses that can be further explored and tested, and thereafter the applicability 
can be determined. 
 
 
1.6 Paper design 
 
The remainder of this thesis will look as follows. In chapter 2, we will present our 
method. We will discuss why we chose the subject we did and how we are to go 
about answering the questions we have set up. We will discuss our interview 
method as well as how and why we chose the persons we did for the interview. 
We will also discuss some issues regarding the theory and the empery, in terms of 
problems that might arise, and validity, reliability and relevance for both areas. In 
chapter 3, we will account for the theory we will be using in the analysis. We will 
present five theories on capital structure, the trade-off theory, the pecking-order 
model, the market timing hypothesis, signalling theory and product-market 
competition models. We will first explain the theories and their applications, then 
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tests and empirical findings. In chapter 4, we will present the empery. We will do 
this question by question, and account for what all the respondents have said, in 
an adapted and easy to follow form (a discussion on this format’s impact on 
validity can be found in the next chapter). In chapter 5, we will perform our initial 
analyses. Theory by theory, we will analyse the answers from chapter 4,  and 
arrive in five separate analyses, all focused from its own perspective. In the 
subsequent chapter 6, we will discuss and analyse the analyses from the previous 
chapter. It is here we hopefully will arrive in some greater insights regarding 
capital structure choice. Lastly, in chapter 7 we will make a brief summary and 
answer the questions posed above. This last chapter is however only to be seen as 
a compliment to chapter 6, not the actual conclusions. In a thesis as qualitative 
and also somewhat subjective as ours, the discussion and the conclusions can not 
be separated. See the model below for a clearer picture of the design of our thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1 Illustrative design of thesis. 
 
 
 
Method
Theories EmperyAnalyses
Discussion
Conclusions
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2 METHOD 
 
In this second chapter we describe and evaluate our choice of method. We 
describe how we chose our interview respondents, how we gathered our empery 
and we discuss its validity both regarding the empery and the method. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Choice of Perspective 
 
We want to examine and map out the most important and prevailing theories on 
capital structure. We then want to examine and understand how managers think 
when they make decisions that affect or alter the capital structure of their firms. 
We will then analyse these answers in the light of the theories to see if they fit any 
specific theory, or if it will be a mix of some or all. We finally want to see if there 
are any common traits and deeper meanings in the different analyses, and from 
these construct hypotheses that will answer our questions, and lay as groundwork 
for further testing. Since we will use the theories to analyse the interviews, we 
have assumed an individualistic perspective (Jacobsen 2002). From this 
perspective, individual interviews are the most important source of information, 
and we will therefore use as open interviews as possible to try and find the 
answers to our questions. This is the perspective we have chosen. As stated in the 
limitations section above, we will not examine differences in firm size, 
profitability, industry, age or business cycle. This is because of the individualistic 
perspective; we are interested in pure reasoning and considerations by 
practitioners, not the firms themselves. 
 
 
2.2 Choice of Method 
 
In corporate finance research, the method of choice is usually a quantitative one. 
We have however chosen to go about solving our problem a different way, for 
two major reasons. First of all, we want to examine reasoning and more subjective 
thinking surrounding capital structure decisions. Second, we feel that the research 
in capital structure theories through the testing of secondary material is quite 
sufficient for the time being. Therefore, our thesis will involve several methods; 
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all explained in this section combined to best fit our purpose. The initial 
theoretical part of our thesis will be a descriptive one (Patel & Davidson, 1994).  
 
With all the thorough research by well renowned researchers in the field, we will 
not aspire to create any new break-through theory that will render all others 
obsolete, or even to significantly add to the existing ones. Instead, we will create 
hypotheses on how the future within the field might develop, leaving them open to 
future testing. Because we therefore do not set out to solve the problem at hand, a 
normative approach (ibid.) is not applicable on our questions.  
 
As hinted in the beginning of this section, our main method is strictly qualitative. 
When looking for reasons and analysing thinking and reasoning, this method is 
the most fitting, and preferable to the more static quantitative one. Instead, we 
have studied a smaller number of respondents, but more closely, under an 
explorative approach. This is the only way to ensure that we will be able to go 
deeper and be flexible in the interviews, in order to obtain the more detailed 
answers that are needed under the explorative approach (Rienecker & Jörgensen, 
2002). After advice from our thesis supervisor Niclas Andrén, and to ensure that 
we do not influence the answers more that we have to, we chose not to examine 
the theory in detail before conducting the interviews. Otherwise the risk of us 
influencing the respondents in a way of thinking that corresponds with the 
theories would be too great. Our entire thesis would then suffer the risk of being 
influenced too much by the already existing theories, and part of the contribution 
to the field would then be lost.  
 
Instead, the explorative approach will allow us to relatively unbiased make deep 
interviews that really gets to the bottom of what the respondent wants to say 
(ibid.). This is the order in which we conducted the study. In this thesis however, 
you will notice that the theory precedes the empery, and not the other way around, 
as we have stated here that we have done. Even though we have chosen to collect 
the empery before we examine the theory, our method of analysis is deductive 
(Backman 1998). The fact that the empery precedes the theory is for the 
methodological considerations stated above. When it comes to the actual analysis, 
the empery is analysed through the theory. The inductive approach sets demands 
on new theory being created (ibid.), and we no not make that claim.  
 
An important note that the reader has to be aware of is that throughout the 
analyses, we will use percentages and relative numbers to illustrate our findings. 
This is however not to be confused with a statistical study, and the numbers are to 
be seen as strictly illustrative, not statistically significant. 
 
 
-The Rationale Behind Capital Structure Decisions - Does Theory Explain Practice?- 
 13 
2.3 Discussion on the Use of Theory 
 
The theories surrounding capital structure decisions lay the foundation for our 
analysis. There is a vast amount of literature and articles that treat these theories 
in different ways. The theories we have chosen to work with are the trade-off 
theory, the pecking-order model, the market timing model, signalling models and 
product-market models. In order to be able to efficiently analyse the empery we 
have collected, we first have to create an exhaustive easy-to-understand 
framework, or in this case, five different frameworks. We have done this by 
condensing and combining the works of numerous researchers in the field. The 
theory is explained thoroughly and then several tests and empirical evidence on 
the theories are presented. This exhaustive run through of theory might seem a bit 
over the top and overly clear to well informed and readers who are familiar with 
the different capital structure theories, but we feel that in order to get a clear 
framework to base the analyses on, and foremost to be able to critique and 
develop hypotheses on how to advance them, we have to be very thorough when 
examining the theory. Initially, we will use the theories for a rather naïve 
categorisation of which answers fit into which theory. This will be the use in the 
five analyses from the different theoretical perspectives. We will then use the 
theory more broadly as a foundation for the discussion on our findings, and also 
as the objects for the discussion themselves, as we have stated earlier. 
 
 
2.4 Gathering of the Information Needed 
 
The relevant data is vast on the subject of capital structure. In the approach we 
have chosen, quality data is of the utmost importance. This is important both in 
terms of the theory and the empery. We have therefore collected a large quantity 
of articles and studies and for being qualitative interviews, a large quantity of 
empirical data. We will in this section present how we have chosen the data, why 
we have chosen the data, and how it was collected. In the subsequent section, we 
will discuss the quality of the data, pros and cons with the data, and general 
critique. We will present the empery and the articles and previous studies 
separately, beginning with the primary. 
 
 
2.4.1 How We Chose the Interview Respondents 
 
When we chose what persons to interview, we set up criterions, and then decided 
on a list of possible respondents. The criterions regarding the persons were that 
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the person had to be involved in the capital structure decision making of the firm, 
preferably as high up in the hierarchy as possible. The criterions regarding the 
companies were firstly that the company needed to be large enough to be able to 
issue debt and equity, both domestically and internationally, that is, in short, it 
needed to be publicly listed on a stock exchange. For accessibility and 
comparability reasons, the companies also had to be listed in Sweden. To satisfy 
these reasons we only had a limited number of companies to choose from, and we 
decided that if the company was listed on the Stockholm stock exchange’s A-list, 
the criterions would automatically be met. From contacts with the concerned 
companies we then created a list of possible candidates. The resulting interviews 
were then mostly an accessibility choice. That is, we contacted all the persons on 
our list, and the ones who had time to answer our questions made the study. One 
person opted not to answer the study for undisclosed reasons; the other who did 
not answer did not think that they had the time. We do not think that this will 
affect our study, because we did get answers from a big enough group anyway.  As 
a result of this, the persons interviewed were (with the exception of one person 
who preferred to be anonymous, in the thesis referred to as Mr X of Company X): 
1. Magnus Lindquist, CFO at Autoliv (telephone interview 5 May 2006).  
2. Björn Andersson at the treasury department at Electrolux (telephone 
interview 3 May 2006)  
3. Roland Hagman, concern controller and former deputy CEO at Ericsson 
(telephone interview 5 May 2006)  
4. Lars Granlöv CFO at Gambro (telephone interview 9 May 2006)  
5. Peter Hjalmarson works as CFO at Getinge (telephone interview 10 May 
2006)  
6. Torbjörn Olsson works as CFO at Gunnebo (telephone interview 8 May 
2006),  
7. Håkan Halén is CFO at Hexagon (telephone interview 8 May 2006),  
8. Anders Almgren is deputy CEO at Holmen (telephone interview 3 May 
2006),  
9. Magnus Jacobson, CFO at Hufvudstaden (telephone interview 10 May 
2006)  
10. Klas Magnus Åkesson, CFO at JM (telephone interview 10 May 2006),  
11. Peter Andersson CFO at Lindex (telephone interview 10 May 2006),  
12. Johan Rydin, deputy CEO executive finance, SCA (telephone interview 3 
May 2006),  
13. Carlos Olsén, concern chief executive at Scribona (telephone interview 9 
May 2006),  
14. Anders Årling, executive at financial services Skanska (telephone 
interview 10 May 2006 
15. Tore Bertilsson concern chief executive at SKF (telephone interview 4 
May 2006),  
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16. Björn Sandberg CFO and croup controller at TietoEnator (telephone 
interview 9 May 2006)  
17. Bo Jacobsson, CFO at concern Trelleborg (telephone interview 8 May 
2006),  
18. Rickard Petri, CFO at WM-data (telephone interview 8 May 2006),  
19. Mr. X, CFO at company X (telephone interview 9 May 2006) 
 
2.4.2 Interview Method 
 
When interviewing the people listed above, we have used telephone interviews. 
The major reasons for this are time, geography and budget. First of all, it was hard 
enough to schedule a sufficient number of interviews over the telephone. We can 
only imagine the hardships we would have gone through had we tried to get 
personal meetings with all respondents. Factoring in the general reluctance to 
allocate time for university students we met from the companies, it is not sure we 
would have gotten even one single interview, let alone 19 as we did now. As we 
felt that we prioritised a larger number of respondents over conducting personal 
interviews, we concluded that telephone interviews best fitted our study. Adding 
to this problem is the general finance nature of the thesis; no company feels that 
they have anything to gain by participating.  
 
The second and third problems work together. Since the interviewees are scattered 
throughout Sweden and sometimes abroad, we would have to travel all over to get 
the interviews, and the time and cost of this, together with the scheduling problem 
would have made this thesis impossible. We therefore settled for the telephone 
interview, and instead tried to do everything we could to make the most of that. 
The largest disadvantage of telephone interviews to personal interviews is that we 
were not able to observe the respondent’s non-verbal response. However, for the 
non-verbal response to be of great importance the questions have to be of a 
sensitive character (Jacobsen 2002), which we do not feel that they are. For our 
study, that loss is minimised. 
 
 The questions have been open-ended and semi open-ended, and from the pre-
defined nine questions (see appendix) we tried to create a discussion with the 
interviewees, and posed follow-up questions where necessary. As is with 
qualitative interviews, some are more fruitful than others, but even the ones with 
less information are important for our discussion and analyses. However, most of 
the interviews turned out as interesting conversations, and gave us plenty to work 
with and laid the foundation for a deeper understanding and a deeper analysis of 
our problem. When we constructed the interview questions, we tried not to pose 
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leading questions that would lead to certain reasoning or in a direction that would 
suit our analysis.  
 
On recommendation by our thesis supervisor, we simply used our already existing 
knowledge on capital structure, in addition to some guidance by the questions 
used in Graham and Harvey’s  (2001) article “The theory and practice of 
corporate finance: Evidence from the field”. Some questions were harder to 
construct than others, so for some of them we decided to pose a rather vague  
question and then to discuss the meaning with the respondents instead. To get a 
complete enough picture of the reasoning behind the capital structure decisions in 
the firm, we constructed some general and some specific questions. As already 
stated, they were however just suppose to act a basis for the discussion, and as the 
reader will see in the presentation of the empery, sometimes the questions where 
answered promptly and directly, and sometimes a discussion around the area was 
conducted instead. We let the interviewees take the lead if they did, and merely 
steered them if they strayed too far from the subjects that relate to capital 
structure. We also consciously tried to not spell out any theories when explaining 
and clarifying, to not bias the answers. What we noticed is that some executives 
were very well familiar with the theories (and rather enjoyed discussing our 
issues), while other did not seem to have any business education what so ever. 
Nevertheless, all interviews contributed to our study, regardless of formal 
schooling of the respondents, this thesis examines reasoning, not knowledge.  The 
actual interviews were as earlier noted performed over the telephone, and in 
Swedish, being the native tongue of the respondents. A discussion on translation 
and validity can be found below.  
 
The entire interview was recorded (after proper consent of course), which allowed 
us to catch everything from the interviews and pick up nuances afterwards. This 
also enabled us to concentrate on the entire interview, not just on jotting down the 
answers. After the interview was over, all answers and discussions were 
transcribed in Swedish (available at request from the authors of this thesis). The 
interviews were then translated, and irrelevant parts were taken out. By irrelevant 
parts we mean either answers where the question was misunderstood altogether or 
questions where the interviewees changed their minds after thinking for a while. 
Our questions, comments and follow-up questions were also taken out. Finally, all 
answers were written down question for question in a somewhat more easy-to-
read manner, without of course changing anything the interviewees said. 
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2.5 Articles and Previous Studies 
 
Our articles and previous studies consist of academic articles and books published 
by recognised researchers in the field. To first get a clear picture of the most 
important theories, we used the article database at the library at the University of 
Lund, and searched for articles on capital structure. We then started to sift through 
articles on each of the five models, and from them we could rather easily see who 
the major researchers on the different theories were. We then chose our articles 
based on the occurrence of the authors names and references to their work in the 
various articles. For each of the five theories, we started out by describing the 
theory and various adaptations of it. We then proceeded to discuss tests and 
studies made on the theory, and also presented the most important empirical 
findings that exist up until today. We used the larger and well quoted works 
regardless of year of publication, but concentrated on the tests and findings over 
the last five years, to make our discussion as current as possible. The theories we 
have examined will form the frameworks in which we will analyse the empery in 
our initial analysis, and also act as a basis for the discussion and resulting 
hypotheses. 
 
 
2.5.2 A Critical Discussion of the Method 
 
The main risk when working with a qualitative method such as this is that it is 
based on the subjective considerations and judgements of the authors. This is true 
for both the empery and the theory. For good or for bad, there is a lot of room for 
individual interpretation (Jacobsen 2002). The risk here is that the authors will 
bias all parts of the thesis. As the room for ind ividual interpretation when 
performed well also is a major benefit of the qualitative method, one has to tread 
gently when analysing the data. There are two ways to come to terms with this 
risk. The first is on the authors. We will try to be as clear and succinct as possible 
in our reasoning, so that the readers themselves can follow our thoughts and 
decide when our analysis is reasonable, and when it is too subjective. The second 
is on the reader. We therefore ask the reader to assume a critical mindset when 
reading particularly the discussion section, as this will no doubt be the most 
vulnerable to author bias. This is the critique that is common to the empery and 
the theory. We will now critique these two separately, as they give rise to 
somewhat different problems. In general when conducting studies and writing 
theses articles there are three important categories of risks that a researcher has to 
take into account, and try to deal with. The first category is validity, that is does 
the data measure what it intends to measure? The second one is reliability, how 
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credible are the sources of data? The third and last is relevance, does the data add 
anything to the study? These are the risks that we will try to address below. 
 
 
2.5.3 Critique on the Empery 
 
The largest risk in the empery is the validity problem. And in this case, it actually 
is a double validity problem. The first risk is to influence the respondents with our 
questions. We have tried to handle this by posing rather open and sometimes even 
vague questions, and also tried to pose them in more of a relaxed discussion 
manner, steering the discussion only in the few instances that it got too far off 
track. We have also refrained from interpreting the answers in the empery section 
(we have of course done this in a structured manner in the analysis), but have 
rather just presented the answers as given by the interviewees. The risk here is of 
course also not only that we have interpreted the answers wrongly, but also that 
the interviewees have misinterpreted the questions. We have clarified when 
needed in the interviews, and we have also discussed eventual interpretational 
risks in the analysis. The second- layer validity risk in the empery is the translation 
part. The reason that this is a problem is a budget decision. The best way to handle 
it would have been to let an authorised translator do the translation, but it would 
have broken this thesis’ budget. So we were left with two alternatives; conduct the 
interviews in English, or translate them ourselves. There are validity risks either 
way. We decided that we would rather face the translation problem that the risk of 
not getting deep enough answers due to insufficient language skills by either the 
interviewers or the interviewees. We have tried to translate as clearly and simply 
as possible, with fairness to the source first in mind, and proper English second. 
Should there be any doubts or questions on the translations, the Swedish 
transcripts are available from the authors of this thesis.  
 
Regarding both reliability and relevance, there are no such risks with the empery, 
since there are no right-or-wrong answers, and the answers themselves are the 
entire purpose of this study. Another risk is that the interviewees have vested 
interests in answering the questions in a certain way. We do, however feel that 
since the answers often relates to how official policies are interpreted and carried 
through in the firms; the respondents do not have any interests either way. 
Furthermore, the questioning is rather general, and the general finance nature of 
the thesis makes for less personal interest on behalf of the interviewees. The last 
note here is on Mr. X. The fact that he opted to be anonymous is due to that he felt 
that he maybe had revealed too much regarding his company’s current standing, 
and that he might be in breach of the Stockholm stock Exchange’s rules for 
official listing by revealing too much. This can mean one of two things. Either the 
other respondents have not thought about this, or they have not answered as freely 
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as Mr. X. We do however feel that we have gotten thorough answers from most of 
the respondents, and do not feel that this is the case. We further can not see how 
the answers have revealed sensitive information, so we do not think this will pose 
a problem for the companies’ listing agreement.  
 
 
2.5.4 Critique on the Theory 
 
There are a vast amount of literature on the subject of capital structure, and many 
theories by many highly renowned researchers. We have tried to minimise the risk 
of invalidity by concentrating on the most pertinent theories and tests, conducted 
by the most cited and referred authors and researchers in the field. Apart from this 
action, it is very hard for us to individually critique  any of the articles. To secure a 
high level of reliability, we have only used articles published in academic 
journals, as we then can be sure that they have been thoroughly examined by other 
researchers already. As for the relevance, all articles that added anything new, be 
it in terms of applications of the theories or tests in different time periods or 
geographies, if they were reliable, we deemed them relevant. 
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3 THEORY 
 
In this third section we present the theories that we will use to analyze the empery 
gathered from the interviews. We base our thesis on five major theories treating 
the choice of capital structure.  
 
 
 
3.1 Trade-Off Theory 
 
The trade-off theory of capital structure is the most common explanation to firms’ 
capital structure. It is widely built upon and tested. We will start in the traditional 
trade-off theory, and move on to explain some modulations to it. In the traditional 
trade-off theory, a firm chooses its capital structure by weighing the tax benefits 
of debt against the expected costs of future financial distress. From this an optimal 
target debt ratio is specified. The optimal capital structure is found at the point 
where the costs of future financial distress exactly outweigh the marginal tax 
benefit of debt (Ogden et al 2002). In the theory, it is at this point that the firm 
value is maximised.  
 
For the initial explanation of the model, we have used the work of Ogden et al  
(2002), who have compiled and tested the theories The theory suggests that for 
every firm, an optimal structure exist, and that that structure differs across firms 
(ibid.). How do we then see what effect tax benefits have on firm value? Ogden et 
al (2002) uses a fictional firm as an example. Suppose the firm earns normal 
earnings. This means that the NPV is zero for all projects, should the firm finance 
with all equity. If the firm takes on leverage, the value increases with the interest 
deductibility on the debt (the tax shield). At the same time, the equity base 
becomes smaller in relation to the capital structure, and thus the increasing tax 
benefit of debt is concentrated on a decreasing equity base, rendering the firm 
with a positive NPV. If expected costs for future financial distress are not weighed 
in, a firm’s value then increases with leverage in infinity (ibid.).  
 
So why does not firms use all debt, or at least close to all debt? The answer is 
financial distress costs. What are then these costs? In short, they are all costs 
related to a firm moving towards bankruptcy. A firm can move toward bankruptcy 
in a number of ways, all stemming from the inability, or expected inability, to 
fulfil its obligations. If the cash flows generated by the firm are not enough to 
fulfil its obligations, one says that the firm is experiencing first-stage financial 
distress. Second-stage is when the firm tries to rectify the situation, usually by 
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cutting costs through lay-offs and plant closings (ibid.). If the problem is not 
solved by this, and the firm begins falling behind on its payments and tries to 
refinance, the firm is in third-stage financial distress. If all fails, end-stage 
financial distress is bankruptcy (ibid.). 
 
What more exactly are the costs of financial distress then? Well, a firm in 
financial distress will have several so called deadweight costs. These include any 
loss of competitiveness in the offering, concessions to stakeholders for increased 
risk, and loss of value in the tax shield (ibid.). Adding to these there are 
bankruptcy costs which include legal, administrative and accounting costs, and 
also liquidation costs at lower value, the so called fire sale. There are however 
benefits of financial distress, should the firm survive that is. These stem from the 
management having to focus on what creates value, and eliminate financial and 
productional slack, as well as from cutting costs (ibid.). The final component to be 
addressed is what financial distress does to a firm’s value and its capital structure. 
Ogden et al (2002) suggest a simple model, where the expected costs of future 
financial distress is a function of the probability of financial distress times the 
distress costs. Adding time and an appropriate hurdle rate, while calculating the 
costs to the present, we get the present value of the expected costs of future 
financial distress. Financial distress costs will then rise with leverage because the 
increased debt means larger fixed payments, and because these periodic payments 
may shorten the time to financial distress (ibid.). The optimal leverage is again 
where the marginal tax benefit of debt is perfectly offset by the marginal present 
value of the expected costs of future financial distress, according to the traditional 
trade-off theory.  
 
Ogden et al (2002) test the traditional trade-off theory by regressing market-to-
book ratios against debt ratios, current debt ratios against past debt ratios, and a 
multiple regression with thirteen independent variables, to test the theory. The 
first regression should suggest a positive relationship between market-to-book 
ratios and leverage, but does not. These results are inconsistent with the traditional 
trade-off theory (ibid.). The second regression should prove mean reversion, and 
does so in favour of the theory. The multiple regressions find that most of the 
coefficients are highly significant, and that the trade-off model explains two thirds 
of firms’ capital structure.  
 
A modulation of the traditional trade-off theory is presented by Miller (1977). He 
suggests that personal taxes offset the tax benefit of debt, since taxes are usually 
higher at the personal lever at than the corporate. He constructs a model which 
incorporates both corporate and personal taxes, known as the Miller equilibrium 
(Ogden et al, 2002). The rationale behind this is that investors have different 
personal tax rates, which leads them to seek different investment opportunities. 
The firm should cater to the investors who prefer debt to equity first, and then to 
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investors who are indifferent between debt and equity, until the investor who has a 
personal tax rate equal to the corporate tax is reached. No more debt will be taken 
on since it is not beneficial, and the optimal capital structure is set at the Miller 
equilibrium (ibid.).  
 
Another modulation is brought forward by Jung, Kim and Stultz (1996), which 
focuses on agency costs of debt and the disciplining role of debt for managers. 
The result is a trade-off between these two factors. Firstly, the disciplining role 
that debt has on managers, it decreases their tendency to over invest for personal 
purposes and thereby decreasing firm value. Secondly, the agency cost of debt 
that can lead to underinvestment, and decrease in firm value. Optimum is reached 
when marginal agency cost of debt is equal to marginal disciplining debt level (or 
agency cost of equity) (Ogden et al 2002).  
 
Lastly, a model proposed by Stulz (1990) means dealing with both agency and 
information asymmetry problems. Managers have personal reasons to overinvest. 
The investors know this, but can not distinguish between good proposals and 
overinvestment proposals from the managers, thus they limit the equity resources 
available to the managers. This can potentially lead to underinvestment. Stultz 
therefore argue that the capital structure should consist of a well thought-out mix 
of debt and equity, and by that mitigating both overinvestment and 
underinvestment (Ogden et al 2002).  
 
 
3.1.1 Empirical Tests of the Trade-Off Theory 
 
When it comes to empirical testing, the various components of the trade-off 
theory is very well documented. We will after our rather thorough declaration of 
the theory try to concentrate on the more important and recent work. For the 
trade-off theory to exist, an optimal capital structure must be set by firms. If this is 
so, empirical time-series tests should show mean reversion. Several researchers 
have shown this, including Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), Javiland and Harris 
(1984), Auerbach (1985), Opler and Titman (1994) and the above mentioned 
Ogden, Jen and O’Connor (2002) (Ogden et al 2002).  
 
Ghosh and Cai (1999) performed a study on a large number of industries with the 
objective of testing for mean reversion to see whether capital structure was best 
explained through optimality or pecking order. They found for almost all 
companies in all industries, an optimal capital structure was present, thus 
favouring of the trade-off theory (ibid.).  
 
-The Rationale Behind Capital Structure Decisions - Does Theory Explain Practice?- 
 23 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) test the trade-off theory against the pecking 
order model, as contending ones, through a time series test. They find that the 
pecking order model very well explains the financing behaviour of firms, while 
the target structure does not. When tested jointly, the explanatory power of the 
latter decreases evens more, while the former retains its power (ibid.).  
 
In 2000, Graham tries to estimate how big tax benefits of debt generally are. He 
finds that on average, the tax benefit of debt is 9.7 percent of firm value (Graham 
2000). In their exhaustive 2001 article, Graham and Harvey (2001) draw several 
conclusions regarding the trade-off theory. The consideration of tax benefit of 
debt is found to be an only marginally important factor when CFO:s set capital 
structure. What is more important is the consideration when foreign tax treatment 
is more favourable than domestic. Firms will then choose to issue foreign debt 
(ibid.). They find very little evidence that firms consider personal taxes a factor 
when determining whether to issue debt or equity, and they therefore conclude 
that firms do not target specific investor clienteles when issuing different classes 
of securities. Expected costs of future financial distress are not found to be an 
important factor when firms choose to raise their leverage, but concerns about 
credit rating is all the more important (ibid.). Almost four fifths of firms have 
target debt ratios, or optimal capital structure ratios. Some more strict, and some 
more loose, but only nineteen percent states that they do not have a target what so 
ever. Generally, the findings speak in favour of the traditional trade-off theory 
(ibid.).  
 
Sarkar and Zapatero (2003) find evidence that firms’ capital structures are mean 
reverting within industries, a finding in favour of the trade-off theory. With this, 
they reconcile the theory with empirical finding that there is a negative 
relationship between earnings and optimal leverage (ibid.).  
 
In a recent study, Brouen, Jong and Koedijk (2005) examine capital structure 
choices by European firms. Along the lines of the traditional trade-off theory, they 
find that two thirds maintain a target debt ratio (ibid.). Further, they find that tax 
benefits of debt are the fourth most important factor, after financial flexibility, 
credit rating and earnings volatility. The factors that speak in favour of the 
traditional trade-off theory are tax benefit of debt and credit rating (through the 
cost of financial distress argument). Direct bankruptcy costs are however not 
considered an important factor when determining leverage (ibid.). They also find 
that issuing foreign debt in response to tax benefits is a moderately important 
factor, and that personal tax is not a consideration when deciding between debt 
and equity (ibid.).  
 
Tests of the existence of costs of future financial distress has also been done, and 
Andrade and Kaplan (1998) shows that in highly levered transactions, costs of 
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future financial distress could be as much as 10 to 20 percent of the firm’s value 
(ibid.). Other costs, for example for outside professionals and internal resources 
range from 0.7 to 4.3 percent of firm value, as shown by Warner (1977), Altman 
(1984), Weiss (1990), Betker (1997), Tashjian (2000) and Branch (2002) (Andrén 
2006). 
 
 
3.2 The Pecking-Order Hypothesis 
 
According to the pecking order model by Myers and Majluf (1984), a firm prefer 
internal financing to external,  and within external, it prefer debt to equity. The  
cost of each financing source is determined by its relative degree of asymmetric 
information. Since the ordering determines the source of financing, and thereby 
the capital structure, these firms should not have a target debt ratio, and an 
optimal capital structure should not exist (Ogden et al 2002).  
 
However, Quan (2002) suggests that even though the traditional pecking order 
model states that an optimal capital structure does not exist, the various tradeoffs 
made in deciding on financing means that at least a range of optimality can be 
observed. The rationale behind the theory is that investors are uninformed of the 
true value of the firm’s investments, which in turn creates two sets of related 
problems. Firstly, the information asymmetries means that the investors are at an 
information disadvantage relative to the management. This creates adverse 
selection costs to the different means of financing. Since the managers have the 
best information, internal funds have the lowest premium. Second are the 
creditors and lastly the investors. The second problem is that managers use this 
private information to issue securities when they are overpriced, whereby the 
investors discount the value of the securities in the market. This can also lead to 
underinvestment by the firm (Andrén 2006). The logic behind this is since the 
securities are underpriced, new shareholders will capture part of the NPV from 
new projects at the expense of the old shareholders. The old shareholders can 
therefore be forced to forego positive NPV projects. This is also because of, for 
the stated reasons, an equity issue will convey information to the market that the 
firm’s securities are overvalued in the market (Myers et al 1984). The pecking 
order model was actually first presented as a way to mitigate this underinvestment 
problem (Quan 2002).  
 
How to eliminate the information asymmetry costs in equity issues is the area of 
the signalling models (Klein 2002), which is explored in a separate section below. 
Equity issues are instead incorporated in the dynamic pecking order model by 
Lucas and McDonald (1990), where managers can choose to issue equity 
following above average market performance, which in turn implies that debt 
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levels are expected to decline when the market performs above average 
(Hovakimian et al 2004). In the pecking order model, tax shield of debt and 
financial distress costs are of second order (Ogden et al 2002).  
 
Since internal funds are preferred, and the firm wants flexibility to not be 
dependent on external financing, managers view financial slack as desirable, as it 
makes the firm less dependant in times of need. This supports the pecking order 
model, but is in itself not enough to establish evidence of the model, since 
flexibility is important in several other models, such as Opler et al (1999).  
 
In the pecking order model by Myers and Majluf, if a firm only use internal funds 
to finance its operations ad strategy, the informational asymmetry problem can be 
totally resolved (Meyers et al 1984). This in turn implies that profitable firms will 
retain earnings and less profitable firms will have to borrow, so there is a negative 
relationship between leverage and profitability, and a positive relationship 
between profitability and the probability that the firm will need to seek external 
financing (Hovakimian et al 2004).  
 
According to an article by Graham et al (2001), financial flexibility is the most 
important consideration that a financial executive takes into account when 
deciding on debt policies. However, consistent with the observation above, they 
find that the flexibility desire is not driven by the pecking order rationale (ibid.). 
However, he also finds evidence in favour of the model. Consistent with the 
pecking order model, firms tend to turn to debt financing when internal funds are 
insufficient. Graham also finds that firms are reluctant to issue equity, and prefer 
convertible debt instead. This is usually because they feel that their equity is 
undervalued in the market, and generally consistent with the pecking order model 
(ibid.). However, for the pecking order model to be truly explaining, it should be 
information asymmetry that causes the financing decisions, but in this study, they 
only seem to be second order (ibid.).  With the costs of information asymmetries 
in mind, an important implication of the model is the role that financial 
intermediaries play in reducing the same. They conduct a thorough analysis of the 
firm before a debt issue, and constantly monitor the state of the company, thus 
reducing the agency costs of debt, and increasing the attractiveness of debt over 
equity (Quan 2002). 
 
 
3.2.1 Empirical Tests of the Pecking-Order Model 
 
Empirical testing of the model has been done several times. Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) found that between the traditional trade-off theory and the pecking 
order model, the results favours the latter. Their contribution was to construct a 
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testable model of the pecking order model based on the assumption that when a 
financing deficit presented itself, this deficit should be matched dollar-for-dollar 
by a change in the firm’s debt, something that they find strong evidence for 
(ibid.).  
 
Frank and Goyal (2003) observe the same thing; however they also find that even 
though debt is more frequently used than equity, the equity is sues tend to be much 
larger when they are used. They use the same testable regression model as Shyam 
and Myers, but on a larger and longer sample. In addition, they also find that 
internal financing almost never is enough, and so external financing is heavily 
used, and that the support they find for the pecking order hypothesis declines over 
time, supported by the fact that equity financing becomes more important (Frank 
& Goyal, 2003).  
 
Fama and French (2002) also find evidence for the pecking order model. They 
observe that profitable firms are less levered than less profitable firms, and short 
term cash flow variation is usually absorbed by debt.  
 
In an article by Tong and Green (2005), the authors find evidence for the pecking 
order model in two instances. First, they find a significant negative correlation 
between profitability and leverage  in firms and secondly, they find a positive 
correlation between large dividends and leverage, which both favours the pecking 
order model over the traditional trade-off model.  
 
More empirical support for the pecking order model comes from a study by 
Narayanan (1988) that shows that if a firm stands before a project, and has both 
debt and equity financing to choose from, it generally either finances with debt or 
foregoes the project (Quan 2002).  
 
In an article by Brouen, Jong and Koedijk (2005), 313 CFO:s are surveyed on 
their capital structure choices. They find strong evidence for the pecking order 
model, except for that companies usually have target debt levels, and that agency 
problems not is a big issue when determining capital structure (ibid.). Also they 
find that financial flexibility is the most important factor for managers when 
determining debt levels. Although this initially can be interpreted as evidence in 
favour of the pecking order model, the desire for financial flexibility is as we have 
seen earlier not necessarily based on pecking order (Opler 1999). The second 
most important thing is target debt ratio, negating the pecking order model 
(Brouen et al 2005).  
 
Finally, a study by Flannery and Rangan (2006) examine whether pecking order 
or trade-off theory explain capital structure decisions by testing if firms have 
target leverage ratios and if so, how quickly they adjust towards them. They find 
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that the typical firm does have a leverage ratio, and typically closes the gap 
between actual and target leverage with one third of the gap each year. Even 
though they find evidence for the pecking order model, they conclude that the 
overarching leverage target dilutes the effect of the pecking order model 
(Flannery & Rangan 2006). The main critique against the pecking order model is 
the model’s inability to explain how taxes, bankruptcy costs, issuance costs and 
investment choice affect the capital structure choice (Quan 2002). The model also 
fails to recognise the added informational asymmetry costs that stems from all 
other stakeholders and claimants of the firm (Baskin 1989). This leads the model 
to be “empirically motivated, but lacking the compelling rational theoretical 
justifications” (ibid.). 
 
 
3.3 The Market Timing Hypothesis 
 
The market timing hypothesis state that a firm issues debt and equity when the 
market conditions are most favourable. The theory dictates how a manager should 
react to over or undervaluation of his firm’s shares, that is, essentially to issue 
when overvalued and repurchase when undervalued. This requires what the theory 
calls market timing ability (Andrén 2006). History has shown us that managers 
are most successful at timing the market in bull markets, and less successful in 
bear markets.  
 
However, Lucas and McDonald (1990), find that no matter what the market, 
managers have information one period ahead of the investors, and try to use this 
information to time the market. They will issue equity directly if they need 
financing and think that they are overvalued, and delay issuing equity if they feel 
they are undervalued. This means that periods of positive abnormal returns will 
usually be followed by an equity issue (ibid.). On building on that research, 
Korajczyk, Lucas and Donaldson (1992), also show that managers can control the 
informational disadvantage of the market by timing issues, and that therefore, 
managers tend to issue equity close after the release of information from the firm 
(Klein et al 2002).  
 
 
3.3.1 Empirical Tests of the Market Timing Hypothesis 
 
Rajan and Zingales find support for the market timing hypothesis in a 1995 survey 
(Rajan et al 1995). They find that leverage and market-to-book ratios are 
negatively correlated, which supports that equity issues are made when the firm is 
highly valued in the market. However, Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996), concludes in 
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their survey that market timing is not a factor when issuing equity (Klein et al 
2002).  
 
In a survey by Graham and Harvey (2001), a majority of financial managers 
consider under or overvaluation an important factor when issuing equity. 
Furthermore, they find that managers try to time the market by issuing debt when 
they feel that interest rates are particularly low. This is especially true for large 
firms (ibid.). There is also some evidence that firms tend to issue debt abroad if 
they feel that interest rates are lower there. Graham and Harvey notes that this 
behaviour is illogic, should covered interest rate parity hold (2001).  
 
In an article by Jeremy Stein (1996), the author advocates discontinuing the use of 
the CAPM in favour of a new model that determines hurdle rates based on the 
specific market conditions at a point in time, that is, a market timing model (ibid.). 
The fundamental idea underlying the model is that the market is irrational, and 
managers should know that. Stein state that when determining an investment and 
financing mix, one has to take three things into consideration; the NPV of the 
investment, market timing gains or losses, and the costs for deviating from the 
optimal capital structure (ibid.).  
 
The most compelling advocates for the market timing theory are Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), who argue that a firm’s capital structure is “the cumulative 
outcome of past attempts to time the equity market” (ibid.). All equity and debt 
issues are made to time the market, which therefore have large and persistent 
effects on capital structure. They test this empirically, and arrive at the conclusion 
that the firm’s valuation in the market (measured by market-to-book ratio) is a 
reliable predictor of the firm’s equity portion in its capital structure (ibid.). With 
regards to capital structure, they are considered to be the first to state that market 
timing best explains firm’s capital structure. They feel that their theory builds on 
the same logic as Myers and Majluf’s pecking order model, where information 
asymmetry and adverse selection costs vary over time, and thereby determine the 
capital structure. Likewise, information asymmetry makes the firm over or 
undervalued which also varies over time, and also determines capital structure 
(Baker & Wurgler 2002).  
 
Hovakimian, Hovakimian and Tehranian concurs that the models are based on the 
same assumptions regarding adverse selection costs, and also concludes that the 
market timing theory is thoroughly empirically motivated (Hovakimian et al 
2004). Butler, Grullon and Weston (2005) argue that even though managers tries 
to time the market, and the market timing theory therefore holds, the predictive 
power of managers stems from pseudo-market timing, and not from superior 
timing abilities and information about the market (Butler et al 2005). Their 
argument is as follows (see also Schultz 2003 for this pseudo-market timing 
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argument). Managers’ ability to time the market and issue equity when it is 
overpriced in the market is measured with the stock’s performance following the 
issue. If the price falls, that is seen as proof that the market was timed accurately. 
Since firms issue equity following a rise in the price of their equity, there exists a 
spurious ex post relation between the firm’s equity issue and its equity price. 
What then seems as an ability by the manager to time the market is simply a 
reaction by firms to the current market conditions (Butler et al 2005). This is the 
efficient market hypothesis explanation to the market timing theory.  
 
On the subject of issuing foreign debt, Brouen, Jong and Koedijk (2005) find that 
managers does to some extent try to time the market by issuing debt in foreign 
countries when they feel that it is interest rate wise profitable to do so. Again, this 
contradicts interest rate parity (ibid.). Finally, in 2006, Flannery and Rangan test 
the 2002 Baker and Wurgler timing theory with a regression, and find that the 
results are significant in favour of the theory, both with regards to debt and to 
equity (Flannery & Rangan 2006). 
 
 
3.4 Signalling with Capital Structure 
 
According to signalling models, a firm can convey private information to its 
investors through its capital structure and choice of financing. The underlying 
issue is the informational asymmetries that exist between the firm and the market. 
The firm has information that it wants to disclose to the market, and uses its 
capital structure to do so. For instance, a sound firm can finance with debt, and 
usually issues shares when they think that their stock is overvalued in the market. 
The market will then incorporate this signal into the valuation of the firm’s shares. 
Issuing overvalued shares also maximizes shareholder value, besides signalling 
the true value of the firm (Ogden et al 2002).  
 
In a pooling equilibrium, there are good and bad firms. The firms know which are 
good and bad, but the market and investors do not. For a good firm to reveal to the 
market that it is good, the can send a costly signal. The signal has to be costly 
enough so that bad firms cannot mimic the signal. This is the classic Lemons 
problem, as devised by Akerlof in 1970. It can for instance issue debt, thereby 
showing that it has a strong enough cash flow to make regular and timely 
payments to the creditors (Ross 1977). It can also take on restrictive covenants 
that the bad firms cannot.  
 
In an article about entrepreneurial finance and signalling, Leland and Pyle (1977) 
shows two ways for entrepreneurs to signal the true value of their project. The 
first is to take a stake in the project, which is by financing part of the project with 
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their own money. The other is to use costly underwritten debt to show that it is a 
sound project. Both findings are conditional on the fact that information 
asymmetries exist. The reason for signalling instead of disclosing the information 
directly is addressed in an article by Bernhardt and LeBlanc (1995).  They find 
that when a firm is sensitive to competition, or stand to loose on new entrants, 
they only convey information though signalling. For a firm that is not subject to 
competition or in industries with large barriers to entry, direct revelation is more 
attractive and likely to be used. Finally, a firm can use dividends as signalling. A 
manager of a good firm can distinguish his firm from the bad firms by committing 
to dividends at a just enough high level too keep the bad firms from mimicking 
the behaviour (Bhattacharya 1979). According to Miller and Rock (1985), this is 
true for all types of cash payouts, including dividends, share repurchases and debt 
retirement. All methods are means to separate good firms from bad, thus 
signalling the quality of the firm’s cash flows, and ultimately the firm value. 
 
 
3.5 Product-Market Competition Models 
 
Early evidence of firms using their capital structure for competition purposes is 
the deep pocket argument by McGee and Telser (Poitevin 1989). This is based on 
evidence that young firms are more vulnerable to distress and bankruptcy than 
older firms, as well as subject to greater informational asymmetries. Poitevin 
(1989) says that a firm enters an industry with a more vulnerable financial 
structure than the already established firms. The firms within the industry can then 
engage in predatory actions such as price wars, and effectively force the new 
entrant out of the industry. This is of course only true when the market is not 
strong form efficient, since the entrant would be able to finance the price war 
completely then (ibid.).  
 
In a competitive industry, a firm should tailor its capital structure to fit their 
desired competitive position. The more flexible a firm is the more it can fight its 
competition, and the more it has to rely on external financing, the less flexible it 
is. If a firm relies on internal financing, it can compete more aggressively with 
price, and the other way around. It is also more likely to exploit its creditors by 
risk shifting. This will naturally be met with covenants and similar measures on 
the part of the creditors. On the other hand, the leverage aggressiveness 
hypothesis states that taking on debt is a commitment to aggressive competitive 
behaviour, which should decrease the optimal output of the competitors, so the 
competitive use of capital strategy works in both ways, with more leverage, and 
with less leverage (Andrén 2006).  
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In an event study by Chevalier (1995), it was shown that increased leverage 
dampened the competition within the industry. This is an integral part of the 
theories, and a very important effect, since it actually means that for a strong, 
financially sound firm, capital structure and increased leverage can be an effective 
way of competing, by providing proof that product-market competition decreases 
when leverage increases.  
 
Connected to the product-market competition models are usually the industry 
models. We will not use these models, since our empiric data does not 
discriminate within industries, and an analysis therefore would be futile.  
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4 EMPERY 
 
In this fourth section we present our empery, which is the statements from the 
telephone interviews with key financial personnel in 19 companies listed at the 
Swedish stock exchange, A-list.   
 
 
 
 
4.1 A Note on the Presentation of the Empery 
 
We have chosen to present all the empery in this separate section of the thesis. 
The empery is presented with all interviewees’ answers to each question together 
compiled into a text, on a question by question basis. This might seem 
overzealous, but in a qualitative thesis, where the discussion and a major part of 
the analysis is based on the subjective considerations of the authors, it is 
imperative that the readers can follow our reasoning and make up their own mind 
on if they agree with us or not. That is why decided to present what can seem as a 
very long section which can sometimes be tedious to read. For an interested 
reader, it will definitely be worth it, and will make for much better understanding 
of our analysis. That said, it is possible to skip ahead to the initial analyses, and 
use the empery section for reference and clarifying purposes. 
 
 
4.1.1 What is The Most Important Consideration When 
You Decide to Take on New Debt in Your 
Company? 
 
Magnus Lindquist is Chief Financial Officer, CFO, at Autoliv (telephone 
interview, 5 May 2006), he believes that some of the most important factors when 
deciding to raise new debt are the price of the debt, the capital structure and the 
financial leverage that they have. Björn Andersson Head of Treasury Support and 
Administration at Electrolux (telephone interview, 3 May 2006) believes that their 
maturity profile on their debt portfolio is one of the major considerations when 
taking on new debt. He says that Electrolux have certain targets for the ir portfolio 
design, but also believes that it is a question of the cost of debt and the financial 
counterparty. Roland Hagman, Concern Controller and former Deputy CEO at 
Ericsson (telephone interview, 5 May 2006) says that they first consider what 
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terms apply for the loans, especially regarding the interest rates. The interest rate 
is dependent on the currency of the loans, Roland continues, and they correct for 
changes over time against the Swedish krona. The largest concern is the interest 
cost; the transaction cost is a one time cost, thus a part of the total cost of raising 
debt. At Gambro they reason that if they did not have the large cash position that 
they have at the moment, they would have raised new debt through loans to cover 
new investments, acquisitions, and to cover fluctuations in working capital, says 
Lars Granlöv, CFO (telephone interview, 9 May 2006). Gambro is not limited to 
the credit market; they can raise financing through both debt and equity, 
depending on the situation. If they are about to make a big acquisition that is not 
realistic to be completely financed with loans, or that the cost of debt is too high, 
or that they can not obtain an optimal capital structure, they then use a mix of 
equity and debt. Gambro has a treasury department that is active in the market, 
and they do not raise debt if they can not see any use for the money. After that, 
they look at how they can optimize their capital structure, what instrument they 
will use, and what currency is suitable to obtain a balance between bank loans, 
bonds, certificates and other types of debt financing. Gambro has not considered 
issuing new equity since 1999.  
 
Getinge’s most important factor when taking on new debt is to be able to fulfil 
their growth strategy, says Peter Hjalmarson, CFO (telephone interview, 10 May 
2006). They need guarantees from creditors that they will get the means needed to 
complete the acquisitions they are pursuing. Of course they also look at the cost of 
debt, but it is not the most important factor, Hjalmarson says. At Getinge they 
have a solidity goal of at least 25 percent, which they consider to be a good 
balance, depending on type of business and variations in the results etcetera. From 
an outsiders point of view it is their required liquidity that controls their ability to 
raise new debt, according to Torbjörn Olsson, CFO at Gunnebo (telephone 
interview, 8 May 2006). According to Håkan Halén, CFO at Hexagon (telephone 
interview, 8 May 2006) the most important factor is what they intend to do with 
the raised funds, questions regarding cost of capital and so forth lays within the 
calculations for the acquisition, if it can bear its own cost of capital or not. At 
Holmen, the cost of debt is the most important factor when raising new debt, says 
Anders Almgren, Deputy CEO (telephone interview, 3 May 2006). At 
Hufvudstaden, if they decided to make a deal, they look at financing costs, such as 
interest rates, but it is really their solidity goal of 40 percent that is the most 
crucial matter, says Magnus Jacobson, CFO (telephone interview, 10 May 2006).   
 
JM do not raise new debt due to the fact that they have a net cash position, says 
Klas Magnus Åkesson, CFO (telephone interview, 10 May 2006). It also depends 
on whether they need to finance new projects, operations, or acquisitions, so the 
answer differs depending on what needs to be financed, explains Åkesson. The 
actual financing that JM does, says Åkesson, is standardized for running projects. 
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If they do so to their balance sheet, they borrow with the perspective that they 
continuously will finance their asset mass, together with the criteria that they will 
have an optimal capital structure. Lindex has two requirements, explains Peter 
Andersson,  CFO (telephone interview, 10 May 2006), first a requirement of 
working credit, and second the required cash to finance their growth and new 
stores. After deciding on their demands, they conduct a standard purchase of debt, 
were they try do get as much benefit possible for the cost. They often chose to 
borrow from their house banks, resulting in a stronger negotiating position over 
the price. The decision whether SCA is going to raise debt or not, follows a policy 
of the average duration of their portfolio. Furthermore, they conduct an evaluation 
of the credit market condition, the various costs of the financing alternatives 
together with the different types of current financing, explains Johan Rydin, 
Deputy Executive Finance (telephone interview, 3 May 2006). In order not to be 
too dependent of a specific capital source SCA uses a mix of bank financing, 
capital market financing and short financing, Rydin continues.  
 
Scribona works in a very cyclical business, where it is important that their 
financing follows their level of business activity, believes Carlos Olsén, Concern 
Chief Executive (telephone interview, 9 May 2006). They have a big equity stake 
at the base, but the depending on the situation, they can not always freely choose 
their financing means exactly as they would like, says Olsén. Anders Årling, 
Executive at Financial Services at Skanska (telephone interview, 10 May 2006) 
believes that the major factors that are considered when taking on new loans are 
the maturity and the price. To raise debt efficiently, they look at the market 
conditions, “one shall borrow money when one do not  need them” (Årling 10 
May 2006). Tore Bertilsson, Concern Chief Executive at SKF (telephone 
interview, 4 May 2006) thinks that the cost is the most important factor when 
raising new debt. According to Björn Sandberg, CFO and Group Controller at 
TietoEnator (telephone interview, 9 May 2006) the key factor is what leverage 
they want on their return. They raise debt under favourable conditions and when 
they want to affect their leverage, also with bigger acquisitions, Sandberg adds. 
Bo Jacobsson, CFO at Trelleborg (telephone interview, 8 May 2006) primarily 
looks at how the debt affects their capital structure. They consider their optimal 
capital structure as being a trade-off between risk and pay-off. They look at their 
future financial plans and their ability to handle their net debt with regards to 
amortizations, interest rates and so on, says Bo Jacobsson. Rickard Petri, CFO at 
WM-data (telephone interview, 8 May 2006) thinks that it is a question of if there 
is an optimal or effective capital structure. To finance through loans instead of 
equity gives a higher payoff on equity, he continues. They have taken up loans in 
situations with acquisitions, and there are limitations on how much debt they can 
raise, but they felt like they were in the right interval at the moment of the 
acquisition, Petri continues.  
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The anonymous company X has a treasury policy concerning the maturity risk and 
interest rate risk. They also look at the duration of their loan portfolio, says CFO 
Mr. X (telephone interview, 9 May 2006). They have decided on the turnover 
ratio of the portfolio of loans, and what risk they face on every possible change in 
interest rate, and also how long it will take before it impacts the long term debt 
portfolio. Sometimes they go long, sometimes short and sometimes a mix, it 
depends on the situation, says Mr. X. This structure is only two years old so they 
have not made any real evaluations yet. They do not think about if they are going 
to raise debt or not, says Mr. X, they do not have a choice. If they do not have the 
money they have to finance through debt, says Mr. X. As long as they have a 
positive debt / equity ratio, they are never in the position so that they can choose. 
They have always had big cash position, but through an rather long project, they 
have worked their way towards a more structured balance sheet, with a better 
leverage of about 0.3 to 0.6, explains Mr. X. Automatically, they always have a 
debt portfolio which increase and decrease over the year, to reach its highest level 
the day after paying out the dividend, and thereafter they work it down to a 
reasonable level. They do not use equity financing before they end up at leverage 
in the region of 1, so basically they do not use equity financing unless they are 
going to make a big acquisition, says Mr. X.  He adds that equity is expensive so 
they do not want to deal with that if they do not have to, cash is cheaper. 
 
 
4.1.2 Do You Raise Debt Abroad? 
 
Autoliv is a non-Swedish company and therefore raises most of its debt outside of 
Sweden, says Magnus Lindquist. They try to match their debt with the location of 
their assets, thus creating a hedge for fluctuations in the exchange rate, he 
continues. Electrolux does not really take up loans outside Sweden, says Björn 
Andersson. But they raise debt bilaterally from banks, and also through different 
programs, where one is a euro-program and the rest are Swedish certificate-
programs, Björn continues. Ericsson raises debt outside of Sweden, and the reason 
for this is that it is hard to raise the amount they need solitarily on the Swedish 
market, Roland says. Ericsson takes up debt mainly in EUR and USD. Gambro 
issues debt abroad, says Lars Granlöv. They work with a group of banks, whereof 
many foreign ones.  Getinge takes up loans in foreign currencies, and the main 
reason for this is that they try to match their debt with the countries currency 
where they have their assets, says Hjalmarson. Gunnebo works with syndicated 
loans, from a combination of nine banks, were some are foreign. Further they 
have raised a secondary debenture loan of 300 million SEK, and there are also 
some bilateral credit lines, both with Swedish and foreign creditors, says Olsson.  
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Hexagon does not take up loans directly outside Sweden but they use syndicated 
loans, built up in cooperation several banks, whereof some are foreign. They also 
have a currency revolver, where they can use nine billion SEK in credit. They 
usually finance by way of introduction with some sort of bridge financing, 
followed by refinancing with further bank syndicates. Holmen raises debt outside 
of Sweden, but Almgren thinks that the Swedish credit market is well priced and 
can compete internationally, so the choice is a matter of price. Hufvudstaden does 
not take up loans outside of Sweden, they do however look at everything that 
makes them competitive, but they think that right now the Swedish credit market 
is satisfying, says Jacobson. JM have 80 percent of their business in Sweden and 
therefore do not raise debt abroad, says Åkesson. Their foreign subsidiaries can 
raise debt abroad, but they do not borrow centrally. The reason for this is that it is 
not cheaper to borrow centrally, and they do not want to face any exchange rate 
risks, says Åkesson.  
 
Lindex raises debt abroad, but only to finance their foreign production, and only 
from Swedish banks, says Andersson. The Swedish banks are more competitive 
than the international banks, Andersson continues. SCA raises debt outside of 
Sweden, with the underlying reason being that the Swedish credit market simply 
can not cover the amounts that SCA needs, says Rydin. Scribona does not raise 
capital abroad. This is however a matter of definition, because their subsidiaries 
abroad also use securitization of their accounts receivables as financing, says 
Olsén. Skanska raises debt abroad in situations when it is most price effective, 
says Årling. SKF takes on debt internationally because it is a larger credit market 
with better pricing and liquidity, says Bertilsson. For TietoEnator, it is a matter of 
definition. They have subsidiaries in 35 countries, and some local financing exists, 
but all financing decisions are taken centrally. The financing of the concern 
structure is made by loans raised from Sweden and Finland. Trelleborg uses a 
syndicated loan structure when raising new debt. It consists of 10 to 15 banks, 
both domestic and international, says Jacobsson. WM-data do not raise debt 
internationally; this due to the fact that Sweden is their biggest market, and that 
they are totally focused on the Nordic countries, so there are no reasons for 
exposing themselves to those kinds of exchange rate risks, says Petri. Company X 
raises debt abroad when they are investing very heavily. They raise debt in 
countries where they make their investments, as a hedge against equity, says Mr. 
X. 
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4.1.3 Does Your Company Have an Optimal Leverage 
Ratio and If They Do, When Is It too high? 
 
Magnus Lindquist refers to their annual report when asked about optimal capital 
structure. He says that Autoliv wants to be investment graded. In order to fulfil 
investment grade status, they calculate their capital structure implicitly on the 
specific credit rating that the leading CRA (credit rating agency) provides. They 
look at numbers like net debt over EBITDA and interest coverage ratios. A net 
debt over EBITDA well below 3 is considered investment grade, says Lindquist. 
Furthermore he believes that they are too highly leveraged if the net debt / 
EBITDA is over 3. Björn Andersson at Electrolux says that they used to have an 
optimal leverage around 0.8, but that they do not use the capital structure in that 
way, and that measure anymore. Instead they look at measurements as net debt 
over EBITDA, measurements used by the CRA, and look at how they correlate 
with their ambition of acquiring a rating of BBB+. They try to adjust their capital 
structure towards the rating level they desire.  
 
Ericsson does not have an optimal capital structure target, but  today they have a 
very low leverage ratio, says Roland Hagman. If they deduct business related debt 
and equity, they arrive at a leverage of approximately 20 percent, he continues. 
Roland says  that they aim to amortize the debt, resulting in an even lower 
leverage ratio. Furthermore Roland Hagman says that after the amortization it is 
up to the owners to decide if they want to change the leverage ratio through 
repurchases. That does not really change the leverage, rather the firm value, or 
they can decide if they want to raise more debt and adjust the equity. Ericsson has 
not ever had any optimal capital structure target, he continues. They had a crisis a 
couple of years ago were they needed capital, and the market had closed down on 
them, and any discussion about leverage ratios or optimal capital structure did not 
take place. Right now they make good profits together with a strong cash situation 
and a lot of equity. Ericsson discusses the possibility to use the assets to buy 
companies, repurchase stocks or pay out the means as dividends. Roland’s 
opinion is that today it is common that a company that acquire a lot of companies 
also have  a very high leverage, whereby they hope that the companies raise in 
value and thereby yield a large payoff on their invested capital. Roland thinks that 
this can affect the way that one wants to finance the company, resulting in a 
demand for higher leverage.  
 
Lars Granlöv at Gambro says that they do not use any debt leverage ratio; rather 
they use solidity as a measure. The long term solidity, beyond 3 years, shall be 
maximum 50 percent. They have looked at how they want to develop their 
product portfolio, the mix of the mature part of the portfolio, start-ups and the 
growth part, and they then decide on how they wanted to see the mix in the long 
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run. He further describes that what really regulates solidity and capital structure 
are covenants from their creditors. If they break these covenants, they must 
renegotiate their facilities. Covenants are the final limit, but Gambro also have 
internal safety nets that will capture any problems before they create a potentially 
serious situation. Getinge’s main concern when deciding on the ir leverage ratio  
are their restrictive covenants, says Hjalmarson. Their gearing, net debt to equity,  
can be at the greatest 1.75, but it is not their explicit goal to always stay within 
that gearing, Hjalmarson continues. If they end up with a too high gearing, above 
1.75, Getinge acts to lower it. Getinge is also able to increase their gearing above 
their covenants, “we then just have to renegotiate our covenants with our 
creditors” (Hjalmarson 10 May 2006). They think that if they have a leverage 
below one, they have a strong balance sheet, resulting in manoeuvrability for 
possible  future acquisitions Gunnebo's leverage is regulated in their credit 
arrangements as one of their covenants. They have a limiting leverage of 1.5, as 
the highest level, but they also have a secondary debenture loan, which is treated 
as equity, says Olsson. So a leverage ratio above 1.5 is above their limiting 
covenants, and thereby too high, Olsson continues.  
 
According to Håkan Halén at Hexagon, the covenants decide. Net debt over 
EBITDA has to be below 3.5 and their solidity can not fall below 25 percent. At 
Holmen, they have an optimal capital structure, says Almgren, it has to be 
between 0.3 and 0.8. That is where they want to be, not having a too low or too 
high leverage. They base this ratio on earlier experiences and on the risk profile 
that they have chosen. A leverage above 0.8 is too high, but it is also depends on 
how the business is going at the moment, says Almgren, “if we do not make any 
money, the leverage must be lower” (Almgren 3 May 2006). Jacobson at 
Hufvudstaden says that what determines the optimality is what targets they want 
in the long term. They want to have solidity above 40 percent, and the reason for 
this is that they want to have the ability, as well in the long run; to conduct 
business in times were it might not be easy to raise new capital. Solidity below 40 
percent is not something that they wish for, says Jacobson. JM strives for, with the 
present asset structure, a solidity of 35 percent. It is really a simplification, and he 
explains that they use a capital allocation model, where they derive risk capital, 
really equity, and residual values on their assets. This risk capital they then divide 
among their operational risk and different asset types. Due to the fact that they use 
a risk capital model, the leverage is a bit lowered, says Åkesson. JM has many 
types of assets, so the reasoning is much too simplified to describe what the actual 
structure looks like, say Åkesson, but their core business, the real estate business, 
shall have a net debt of zero. Lindex does not have an optimal capital structure or 
leverage ratio. But they think that their present situation, with 100 percent equity 
finance, is a very expensive form of finance. Andersson explains that they intend 
to change their present situation in some way, but that they  do not have any stated 
destination at the present. On the question of when they think that they have too 
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high of a leverage, Andersson says that they have an extremely to low present 
leverage, and the question is not valid due to their lack of debt.  
 
SCA's optimal leverage is 0.7 which is a result from a theoretical analysis of their 
optimal leverage ratio, with their current business risk, and including a buffer for 
financial emergencies or cost of financial distress. Rydin argues that they do not 
want to be to close to their optimal capital structure; due to that it is rather high. 
Their leverage is definitely too high if it is above one. This is mainly because they 
then would get a lower credit rating than they aim for, says Rydin. Scribona does 
not have an optimal capital structure. They have solidity between 2 to 30 percent, 
depending on season, but they do not discuss it right now, says Olsén. Skanska 
have a net cash position, so at the moment their gross debt is zero, says Årling. 
They do not have optimal leverage as a financial target, but there are certain 
numbers that they do not feel comfortable with ending up around, explains Årling. 
Instead they look at other profitability ratios like total equity in relation to the 
balance sheet and approximately five other ratios. A net leverage of 50 percent of 
equity is not something that they are pleased with. Not that there are any problems 
for the company, says Årling, but it is not what they want. Furthermore, Årling 
explains that in their line of business it is crucial to have a strong balance sheet, so 
they have a program to lever up the balance sheet, highly. Årling explain that they 
look at it from two perspectives, the stock market perspective and the creditor 
perspective. The stock market wants as high leverage as possible, Årling says, 
when the creditors strive to retain a lower leverage. Skanska believes that it is 
important to show credibility against their creditors and towards the industry they 
are active in, so they prioritize a strong balance sheet. Then they try to find an 
equilibrium to please the stock market as well, says Årling.   
 
SKF has an optimal leverage of 0.5, based on their operational sensitivity and 
their attachment to a desirable credit rating. Leverage above 50 percent will be too 
high, as it exceeds their optional leverage. TietoEnator's optimal capital structure 
is connected to what leverage they want. The present optimal leverage is 
approximately 40 percent, which is a decision for the long term, says Sandberg. 
What matters is the amount of risk that TietoEnator is willing to expose their 
investors to, but they also look at the competition and their competitors’ positions 
in the market. Sandberg does not think that their leverage deviates from their 
competitors, since it would negative ly affect their risk profile and thus their share 
price.  
 
At Trelleborg they have an optimal capital structure between 75 to125 percent of 
debt in relation to their equity. They reason that there is equilibrium between risk 
and pay-off. Their return on equity will rise with higher leverage, says Bo 
Jacobsson. They look at ratios like net debt in relation to EBITDA which is the 
same ratio as S&P and Moody’s use at when they evaluate companies’ credit 
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standing. Even if Trelleborg does not have a stated rating target, they still adjust 
slightly to the CRA measures, says Jacobsson. They look at how they can handle 
changes on the credit market and what the future interest rates and their cash 
flows will be. It is important that they feel secure, that they can handle future 
changes of interest rates and cash flow. At WM-data they do not have any 
outspoken goals regarding this issue, but Rickard Petri feel, together with the 
board, that the current capital structure of 40 percent  is rather optimal. A leverage 
of 60 to 70 percent would be too high. Company X does not have a specific 
optimal capital structure. Today they have a leverage of 0.6 together with a very 
high profitability and strong cash flow, but if it will rise above 1 it will be too 
high, and they will be forced to take actions to bring it down, says Mr. X. 
 
 
4.1.4 How Do You Finance New Projects And 
Acquisitions?  
 
Magnus Lindquist explains that Autoliv finances new projects and acquisitions in 
different ways, depending on their size. Smaller investments are financed through 
retained earnings or internal cash flows and larger investments are financed 
through loans. The financing is tailored so that it will fit their capital structure, he 
continues. At the moment, Magnus says, they have a too strong rather than too 
week balance sheet, resulting in that they can acquire a lot, and finance it through 
debt at a different levels than if the situation was different. Björn Andersson at 
Electrolux says that due to a very strong balance sheet, the question has not been 
raised, but if it is necessary, they will finance through loans. Due to their vast 
amount of cash, the end of the fiscal year 2005 approximately 70 billion SEK, 
Ericsson uses cash to as far as possible to finance new projects and acquisitions, 
says Roland Hagman.  Gambro is also in a situation where they have a lot of cash, 
so they use that cash to finance their subsidiaries. They also look at the capital 
structure of their subsidiaries, and at a combination of financing by equity and 
loans, which can be a mix of capital contribution and internal loans to their 
subsidiaries. It works in the same way for the parent company. If they need more 
capital they are not afraid to issue new equity.  
 
Lars Hjalmarson and Getinge financed most of it latest acquisitions through bank 
financing. Getinge’s cash position is not used to finance investments or 
acquisitions, they only hold the amount of cash that the corporation needs for 
running its business, explains Hjalmarson. Normally, they do not have any cash, 
except very temporarily, and if they receive a lot of cash they use it to amortize on 
their loans.  Hjalmarson says that they address the stock market if and when they 
need capital, and over last ten years, with their acquisitions, they have issued new 
stock of approximately 500 millions SEK. Before, they had a leverage of 1.9 to 
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2.0 that they geared down with an equity issue in order to reach numbers below 
1.75, Hjalmarson says. Gunnebo has an unused long term credit of nearly a billion 
SEK and that is what is mainly used for investments and smaller acquisitions, says 
Torbjörn Olsson. But above that, financing has to be realized together with their 
equity side, so that they raise more equity and also use some kind of bridge 
financing, say Olsson. Hexagon mainly finances through retained earnings and 
loans. When they expand they start out from their covenants, net debt over 
EBITDA, and it is crucial to have the space to be able to absorb new investments, 
says Halén.   
 
Almgren describes his firms financing strategy as one where they separate the 
project from its financing. First they decide if the project is good or bad, the 
financing decision comes second. If business is good they finance with internal 
funds as far as possible. With the debt policy they have, they are always able to 
find financing, says Almgren. Hufvudstaden finance their bigger projects through 
bank loans, but they also look at their solidity. A couple of years ago they did an 
equity issue, and the reason was because they wanted to have a certain debt/equity 
ratio, says Jacobson. JM finances with running financing. They have an unusually 
strong balance sheet, Åkesson explains. They have redemption in June, so all the 
questions are concentrated on tenure, he continues. Lindex finance acquisitions 
and projects through retained earnings or their cash position, they do not raise new 
debt. If they are going to give their owners a decent pay off on invested capital, 
the way that Lindex finances, is a very expensive way of financing says Magnus 
Andersson.  They have had a dividend yield of 8-10 percent the last years, and 
they naturally do not have any objections, says Andersson, to pay out cash to the 
owners, but in the long run,” to finance the business, it is better to pay 3 percent 
to creditors than 10 percent to their owners” (Andersson 10 May 2006). It is in 
the business culture of Lindex to have zero liabilities. This is due to that Lindex, 
together with other merchant companies, only have had organic growth. Many 
corporations have huge goodwill posts on their asset side that turns into equity on 
their debt side of the balance sheet, Andersson continues. Lindex can only pay out 
their free capital. One thought could be to raise a billion SEK and divide it to the 
owners, but this can only be done if Lindex have the same amount of free capital, 
says Andersson. A consequence of organic growth is that it is hard to accumulate 
free capital. This is a dilemma for the company, Andersson explains, due to that 
retained earnings can be used to gain free capital, but some of the means must be 
paid out as dividends. Lindex is the kind of firms that private equity firms acquire 
and refinance through high leverage.  
 
SCA uses normal company financing and they never had any earmarked capital to 
finance acquisition. They start from their cash flow and for the time actual credit 
guarantees. They then finance through loans, not through equity, Rydin says. 
Skanska uses primarily existing credit structure or cash. In general terms they use 
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their cash position to pay off debt and to make minor acquisitions. Skanska does 
not make as big acquisitions  so that the company will double in size over night, 
says Årling. They have not thought much about it, but five to six years ago they 
bought a lot of medium size companies, and then they worked with a type of 
external loan financing. SKF primarily uses cash or loans to finance new projects 
and acquisitions. TietoEnator normally finance through internal cash flow, and the 
reason for this, explains Sandberg, is that it is cheaper than external financing, 
which is cheaper than equity. Trelleborg first uses the credit arrangements that 
they have. Often they use bridge financing, were they take on a temporary loan 
which is then refinanced later with a long term financing. The advantage of this, 
explains Jacobsson, is that they can get a faster and simpler financing, not 
involving many banks in the process. Often in an acquisition, they have to act fast, 
and this is where bridge financing comes in handy, Bo Jacobsson believes. For 
certain situations an equity issue is possible, but with today’s low interest rates 
they usually finance through loans.  They do however also look at what capital 
structure the acquisition results in, and then choose action depending on the 
situation, says Jacobsson.  
 
WM-data finance through debt with the underlying reason that they lay below 
their defined optimal leverage, so the alternative is more expensive and less 
effective, says Petri. Company X finances mainly with cash or debt. They do not 
want to finance too much with equity, due to its higher cost. But as mentioned 
before, an equity issue can be feasible when they are financing very big 
acquisitions. Scribona finance mainly through securitization of their accounts 
receivables. They also have a very cyclical business, wherein it is very important 
that their financing follow their level of business activity, believes Olsén. Olsén 
mean that when Scribona has a high level of business activity with high sale and 
invoicing, then they also need higher financing, which the securitization program 
can help them with. They have a big equity piece at the bottom, but the situation is 
not always so that they can choose financing. That is another reason for the 
securitization, says Olsén. Their bank connection provides the means outside the 
securitization program, should they need any.  
 
 
4.1.5 When Do You Issue Equity / Repurchase Stock, or 
Pay out Dividends? 
 
Magnus Lindquist says tha t an issue of new stock is not on the agenda and 
repurchases and dividends are made yearly, for further information he refers to the 
annual report. They have never made any larger one-time dividends, he continues. 
Electrolux has sold parts of its business, resulting in high cash flows, says Björn 
Andersson. An equity issue is not at the agenda due to the strong balance sheet. 
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Normally they issue equity only when a big acquisition needs to be financed. 
Dividends are something that takes place yearly and repurchases has been made 
on numerous occasions to lower the leverage ratio. Ericsson does not have any 
expressed policy on when they issue equity, repurchase stocks or payout 
dividends. There are no such ideas at the moment, except possibly among some of 
the members of the board, and they choose to discuss it when the matter arises, 
according to Roland Hagman. Further he says that if the situation arises, they have 
to do what is best for the owners; it has to do with tax considerations for the 
owners. But he also thinks that due to their earlier crisis with the following equity 
issue, it would be very strange if they decided to return the money when the 
market has changed and the crisis is over. Gambro in October sold half of their 
concern business, resulting in a change from having net debt to having a big net 
cash position, says Granlöv. They also shifted out 10 billion SEK through a stock 
redemption program last year. They still have a large cash position and the reason 
for this is that they, within a year, plan to use the means for strategic investments, 
says Granlöv. Gambro also, if the strong balance sheet is sustained, intends to 
shift out more cash to the owners, and Granlöv can not say if it will be through 
dividends, stock repurchases or redemption. The reason that Gambro chooses 
ordinary redemption is that it treats all investors alike, targeted repurchases and 
dividends is not as tax effective as redemption, Granlöv continues.  
 
For Getinge, stock repurchases is not an alternative, they would rather keep their 
capital within their company to finance upcoming acquisitions and to develop 
company projects, thinks Hjalmarson. Getinge has a dividend policy that states 
that they will distribute one third of the net revenues each year. Gunnebo shift out 
some part of their capital to their investors as dividends every year. Above that 
they have the long term goal of a liquidity of 25 percent, and together with their 
covenants that is what decides what action is to be chosen. For Hexagon, 
according to Halén, an equity issue only occurs when they can explain what the 
money is for; they never do an equity issue just for raising cash. What Håkan 
Halén means with this is that they first finance an investment or an acquisition 
with a bridge financing, and then they possibly refinance with an equity issue. 
Hexagon’s focus is on expansion, so they will never have enough cash to 
repurchase stock. They pay out yearly dividends, and occasionally they have 
shifted out non core business stocks and then the ordinary dividend on top. 
Holmen uses those kinds of capital structure adjustments when they end up 
outside of their optimal capital structure range, says Almgren.  
 
Hufvudstaden pays yearly dividends. They also have a mandate from their annual 
general meeting to repurchase stocks if and when it will be a good investment, 
says Jacobson. The size of dividend and or repurchase of stocks is all means to 
adjust the capital structure, Jacobson, continues. JM has a policy that states that if 
they have a stronger and more durable capital structure then they need, they shall, 
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at a suitable moment, and in a suitable form distribute the means to their owners, 
says Åkesson. If it is through dividends, repurchases or redemption depends on 
the situation. They have not issued new equity in many years, but if they are 
facing a larger acquisition or similar, it is possible, says Åkesson. Furthermore 
they have sold real estate, since the end of the 90s for approximately 16 billion 
SEK, which they have reinvested in land and housing, and they have also initiated 
two dividend programs and one redemption program, so they are more likely to 
have too much capital than the other way around, says Åkesson. These programs 
have enabled them to have a more optimal capital structure. Redemption, 
repurchases and dividends or other transfers of means to Lindex’s owners is used 
when there is overcapitalization, and it is allowed for with enough free capital, 
says Andersson. An equity issue can be expected that day when Lindex has a 
decent leverage together with an attractive investment opportunity. Lindex this 
February decided on a redemption program of 550 million SEK.  
 
For SCA, an equity issue can be close at hand when they are about to make a big 
acquisition that can not solitarily be financed through loans. Stock repurchases 
can be an option when they are overcapitalized and when they do not se any, for 
strategic acquisition or operational investments, use for the capital within a 
reasonable time, Rydin continues. The same considerations apply for larger extra 
dividends. Scribona is about to distribute one of their subsidiaries and they do not 
make much money at the moment, so any ordinary dividend or repurchase is not 
feasible. They think that they manage with their securitization program. An equity 
issue, for the same reason, is neither at hand. Skanska start out by looking at the 
company’s long term need, and the target of a strong balance sheet, and thereafter 
they look at these kinds of issues, Årling says. If they have a strong balance sheet 
and still can please their investors demand for not holding too much cash, then 
they shift out money. An equity issue has not been done in years, and is not on the 
table. Tore Bertilsson says that SKF issue equity only when facing a very large 
investment. Repurchases can be realized when their financial situation, in the long 
term, is too strong. They pay yearly dividends and in terms of larger extra 
dividends, the same consideration is made as for repurchases, says Bertilsson.  
 
It also applies to the leverage at TietoEnator, says Sandberg. They continuously 
repurchase in order to adjust their capital structure and the leverage that they have 
in the market. They also repurchase for the moment, due to a bonus program, 
Sandberg continues. They pay out yearly dividends, larger extra dividends is not 
an issue with their present strategy and what they want to communicate to the 
market. An equity issue is possible when they are facing a large acquisition, says 
Sandberg. Trelleborg has a dividend policy that they will shift out 30 percent of 
their net result, so they have a rather high dividend yield, thinks Jacobsson. They 
repurchase in order to obtain a more optimal capital structure, if they think that 
they have too low leverage and too much equity, and if they do not, in a 
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reasonable period of time, see that they can change it. An equity issue, for WM-
data, would be feasible if and when they would get a too high financial risk and 
financial cost for a potential acquisition, or exceed earlier mentioned limits, says 
Petri. A repurchase would be interesting when they have a leverage that is so low 
that it would be inefficient, however this is very hypothetical, says Rickard Petri, 
because their exist so many interesting possibilities within their market.  
 
Company X pays yearly dividends, and they have paid larger extra dividends five 
times over the last ten years, says Mr. X. They have a very strong balance sheet 
together with a very strict policy that tells them not to diversify their business, so 
they have a balance sheet and means to handle all the financing, acquisitions or 
loans that they need to do. If they end up with excess cash, which happens time 
and time again, their owners have  decided that they will pay it back to them for 
the owners to diversify with themselves instead of doing it within the company. 
They do not repurchase or redeem stock. They have a special investor situation, 
were one owner has 60 percent of the company, and they can not and will not 
change that. They also have a problem with bad liquidity, so they have a rather 
small free float, thus they will minimize any action that will lower the free float. 
That factor results in that the only alternative they are left with is extra dividends, 
says Mr. X. Mr. X is aware of the problem and that it is not the most optimal, but 
on the other hand they do not have that big portion of international investors to 
create the problems you get with extra dividends instead of other actions, says Mr. 
X. 
 
 
4.1.6 Do You Take Your Investors’ Tax Rate into 
Consideration When Changing The Capital 
Structure? 
 
Due to the fact that Autoliv makes yearly dividends and repurchases, Magnus  
Lindquist believes that they take into consideration the taxation of their investors 
when changing their leverage. Electrolux reflects over what effect a certain 
adjustment of the capital structure will have on their investors, says Björn 
Andersson. Roland Hagman thinks that Ericsson has so many different investors, 
many which do not pay tax on dividend and 50 percent  are foreign investors, so it 
will be very difficult for them to make such judgments. At Ericsson they rather 
look for what is good for the company. Gambro does not explicitly consider their 
owners tax rate when changing their capital structure, but Granlöv means that they 
did it in their last situation when they used a redemption program instead of 
dividends, in order to shift out cash. It is not a big question for Getinge, says 
Hjalmarson. This type of decision is made with concern for their creditors, their 
growth plans, and their connection with their core banks, resulting in the present 
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covenants. Gunnebo has not made any dramatic changes in their leverage, so it 
has never bean necessary to look at it from that perspective, thinks Torbjörn 
Olsson.  
 
Hexagon does not consider the investors tax rate when changing their capital 
structure. Holmen has a wide spread of different investor classes, Almgren 
describes their current owners to be pension funds, institutions, both international 
and domestic, foundations, investment companies and private investors. The  
taxation of their owners varies and thus they have to look at the average investor, 
Almgren continues. They look at how their capital structure affects their owners 
in total, and if some specific owner is affected more unfavourably than others they 
have to take that into consideration, says Almgren. Normally it does not matter if 
they emit or repurchase stocks, or other similar adjustments, says Almgren. 
Hufvudstaden does not consider the investors tax rate when changing their capital 
structure. JM looks at their existing owner base and uses the appropriate method 
when they adjust their capital structure, according to Åkesson. Lindex uses the 
method that they think is the most tax effective for their owners, when transferring 
money to them. Andersson explains that with the recent redemption, they chose 
the specific payout method; due to that it was a winning situation for all of their 
investors. They take consideration to the investors' interests, collectively, says 
Andersson.  
 
At SCA they do not consider their investors tax rate, according to Rydin. Scribona 
does not either consider their investors tax rate, according to Olsén. Skanska do 
not look at the leverage ratio per se, but they do to some extent discuss the tax 
situation of their owners when they plan on how to distribute means. That is 
however not what decides if they are going to pay out cash or not, but there are 
techniques that makes it as comfortable as possible for all involved, says Årling. 
One possibility is to issue a new type of equity followed by redemption, but they 
do not do it as advanced tax planning, Årling emphasize, they just use common 
sense. SKF believes that their consideration taken to their investor’s taxation is 
only marginal. TietoEnator carries the discussion, but do not make any 
consideration of the tax rate of their investors in that situation. Bo Jacobsson can 
not remember that they made any such considerations. But if they pay any large 
extra dividends, then maybe, says Jacobsson. That is however not anything that 
they have done in the past or think about today. Rickard Petri at WM-data says 
that they do not make any such considerations explicitly, but it lies within the 
theoretical model. Mr. X at company X does not consider this topic, but they 
would if their owner situation were different. Then a program with a split, 
together with an extra redemption, is something that they would use, says Mr. X. 
They would let the stock trade a little, and let the redemption take place so and so, 
giving the foreign investors the ability to solve their tax problem. But it is not a 
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situation for company X at the moment, and they have asked their current foreign 
owners and they have not objected, say Mr. X. 
 
 
4.1.7 Does Your Company Use Their Capital Structure 
Or Leverage Ratio for Signalling Purposes? 
 
Magnus Lindquist is not familiar with the term signalling, but when explained to 
him he refers to a policy presented in the annual report. Electrolux do not use their 
capital structure for signalling purposes, says Björn Andersson. Ericsson has not 
had any signalling discussion. Gambro do not use their capital structure for 
signalling purposes, says Granlöv. Getinge do not actively signal anything with 
their leverage, but Hjalmarson thinks that they implicitly signal an attempt to 
return to normal and functional levels, if they increase the ir leverage. Torbjörn 
Olsson at Gunnebo thinks that it is something they look at continuously, due to 
their covenants and credit arrangement towards their banks.  Håkan Halén at 
Hexagon does not use the leverage ratio for signalling purposes. Holmen does not 
use their capital structure for signalling, except the goals earlier mentioned, they 
work with the wide financial targets and do not adjust them very often, says 
Almgren. Magnus Jacobson at Hufvudstaden is not aware of the term “signalling” 
and they have not made any such considerations. JM do not use their capital 
structure for signalling purposes, they continuously work with optimization of 
their balance sheet, says Åkesson. If they find that they have a too strong balance 
sheet they shift out more money to their owners, they do not raise more debt.  
 
Lindex do not use their capital structure or leverage for signalling, but Andersson 
talks about that the signalling effect, that they can honour their commitments, lays 
in their cash flow. At SCA, Rydin explains that they use their capital structure in 
their communication with the credit market, but he thinks that measures like cash 
flow in relation to debt are much more important measures. Measures as retained 
cash flow and funds operations divided by net debt are measures that the CRA 
uses when they apply their rating. Those measures are more important, Rydin 
thinks, because the leverage per se does not reveal any information about how 
much money they make in order to amortize and pay the interest cost on their 
loans. Olsén at Scribona is not familiar with the term signalling, “It sounds like 
Morse code to me” (Olsén 9 May 2006). Skanska does not work with the leverage 
ratio as a primary instrument for communicating with the market, says Årling, 
there are other factors that they look at, such as cash flow, equity and profitability 
targets. “It is not the tail that wags the dog, but the opposite” (Årling 10 May 
2006). Årling however also says that they are very concerned about that their long 
term goals are clear and straightforwardly communicated to all stakeholders, to 
the stock market and to their creditors. SKF does not use their capital structure for 
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signalling purposes. TietoEnator does not use their capital structure for signalling 
purposes. Trelleborg does not use their capital structure for signalling purposes, it 
is matter of how they look at their  cash flows and their return ratios, says 
Jacobsson. They can not have a leverage that is too low, because then it is hard to 
reach their goal of return, says Jacobsson, so a certain leverage is necessary for 
them to reach their pay off ratios.  
 
WM-data do not use their capital structure for signalling purposes, says Petri. At 
Company X they try to avoid talking about what leverage ratio they have, and if it 
is good or bad. The reason for this is that they do not want to raise any 
expectations of extra dividends. If analysts discount enormous dividends to their 
stock price, it will fall like a rock if they are not able to fulfil the expectations. 
This creates irregularities in their stock price, so they do not want the market to 
connect their capital structure or leverage ratio to their dividend policy, says Mr. 
X.  
 
 
4.1.8 Do You Consider The Management’s Flexibility 
When Changing The Leverage Ratio within Your 
Company? 
 
Magnus Lindquist believes that they consider the manoeuvrability of the 
management when changing the capital structure, though a good investment can 
always be motivated. “A good deal stands on its on merits” (Lindquist 5 May 
2006). Electrolux’s strong balance sheet results in a greater flexibility for 
acquisitions, says Björn Andersson. An acquisition financed by external financing 
as bank loans etcetera takes longer time to raise than internal financing, therefore 
the stronger flexibility, says Björn. Ericsson definitely accounts for the 
manoeuvrability of the management when adjusting the capital structure, says 
Roland Hagman. Further Roland says that all the questions regarding their capital 
structure is handled in a finance committee, which is a sub-committee to the BoD.  
The corporate management only acts within the boundaries they get from the 
finance committee, Roland continues. Ericsson has boundaries for everything, and 
if they want to change the framework they must run that through the committee. 
This happens now and then, due to changes in business criteria.  
 
Lars Granlöv at Gambro says that everything must be evaluated when it comes to 
investments and acquisitions, and within Gambro there is  a policy on how much 
the management or CEO can decide upon, without asking the BoD.  The limit, 
before a decision has to go through the BoD, is relatively low for Gambro. There 
are regulations on what documentation, what minimum pay off an investment 
must yield and so forth. The investment is then continuously reviewed, in order to 
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control the progress and results, and  if it does not develop as expected they decide 
on which corrective action is necessary, Granlöv explains. Getinge believes that if 
they gear up the company, the manoeuvrability of the management, in the sense of 
trying to move the company in a certain direction, changes. But at the same time; 
“one never gets the leverage you get if you do not  have the board and the owners 
behind you” (Hjalmarson 10 May 2006). At Gunnebo all investments have to be 
approved by the board, so they have an awareness of the issue, thinks Olsson. 
Even if the means are there, the management can not make any investments 
without the approval of the board, Olsson continues. Beyond that, they want big 
manoeuvrability for their board, to do medium size business, and that is what they 
are signalling by their one billion SEK of credit, says Olsson. According to Halén 
at Hexagon, they do not consider it, except that they need a big head room to 
continue expanding. They performed an equity issue of 2.7 billion SEK, which 
gave them bigger flexibility to expand, says Halén. The manoeuvrability of the 
management is considered and lays within Holmen’s choice of capital structure, 
says Almgren. At Hufvudstaden, there is a continuous discussion with the BoD on 
the financing and if they are about to sell, invest or acquire. It goes for all 
financing decisions, thinks Jacobson, and all larger investments have to be 
approved by the board.  
 
JM is aware of the problem, and they think that they should have a moderate 
capital structure so they do not risk any stupid choices on behalf of the 
management. At the same time they say that it is always important to have an 
offensive balance sheet, even if they shift out money to the owners, so that they 
are able to make acquisitions if they have to, says Åkesson. At Lindex they 
consider the manoeuvrability of the management, but they do not think of it as a 
big problem, thinks Andersson. Andersson explains that his job as a CFO is to 
sustain enough cash for the CEO to be able to go through with the plans he 
desires. He continues to say that these plans are also presented to the BoD and the 
general annual meeting. Independent on if the form of the capital is cash or 
unused credit, the CEO always can make value destroying decisions. However the 
CEO has some limitations in his power of attorney, plus that they have internal 
regulations on how big investments the CEO can decide on without first running 
them through the board. Lindex has a restrictive governance system to prevent  
adverse situations, says Andersson. Rydin at SCA believes that their headroom is 
a part of their buffer against financial distress earlier mentioned. They want 
flexibility for the management to make loan financed acquisitions without asking 
the stock market to finance it with new equity, says Rydin.  
 
At Scribona they have never taken the manoeuvrability of the management in 
consideration, in that sense, says Olsén. Skanska reasons in a similar way, that 
they want the management to be able to lead a functioning business. One strategic 
cornerstone, according to Årling, is that they have a sound balance sheet, with 
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different satisfying financial ratios. With its help they can then act in a 
professional way with manoeuvrability for the management. They gladly satisfy 
all their claimholders, but preferably over time, and that is why they need the 
manoeuvrability that a sound balance sheet will yield, together with a solid 
diversification and good business portfolio. Bertilsson at SKF believes that they 
do not consider the manoeuvrability of the management but rather the 
manoeuvrability for the company as a whole.  
 
According to Björn Sandberg at TietoEnator this is something that they look at. 
He thinks that, due to the fact that they have had high growth and are still growing 
strongly through acquisitions, it is important that they have manoeuvrability. Due 
to that a major part of Trelleborg’s growth is non organic, they reason around 
expansion possibilities, and their possibilities to finance such an expansion. This 
and their capital structure affects their manoeuvrability, so that is something that 
they consider, says Bo Jacobsson. WM-data thinks about these issues, it is never 
good to have an overcapitalized company, says Petri, just the opposite, it is always 
dangerous due to the fact that the management can destroy the money. Mr. X 
representing company X does not take that into consideration. With their 
marginal, their return on equity and working capital they have to be extremely 
careful not to purchase or do anything that will dilute their EBIT marginal. They 
are very careful, so management’s flexibility is not an issue at X, says Mr. X. 
 
 
4.1.9 How does Competition Affect your Capital 
Structure and do you Use your Capital Structure as 
a Competitive Advantage? 
 
The business that they are in, believes Magnus Lindquist, affects their capital 
structure. They must be careful, especially in bad times, not to take on too much 
debt.  On the second question he answers that in their industry they have a better 
capital structure and less financial problem than their competitors, therefore they 
can say that they use their capital structure as a competitive advantage. At 
Electrolux they do not consider how competition affect their capital structure, 
neither do they think that their own capital structure is used as a competitive 
advantage, says Björn Andersson. Roland Hagman at Ericsson does not think that 
competition affect Ericsson’s capital structure, he rather thinks that it is their total 
capital binding that is affected. He describes a situation were due to the tough 
competition they must hold an investment or a project in the balance sheet longer 
than necessary. Ericsson does not use their capital structure as a competitive  
advantage but Roland Hagman adds that it might have an effect indirectly, due to 
that their relationship with their customers reaches over long time and it is 
positive for them that Ericsson has a solidity of nearly 50 percent and strong 
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finance. Gambro has, compared to their competitors, one of the strongest balance 
sheets in their business, giving them the manoeuvrability they need, so they have 
not really felt the need to discuss the topic, according to Granlöv. In the short 
term, if they feel like it, they could compete with other companies, but it is not 
how they work, according to Granlöv. “We compete on operational terms” 
(Granlöv 9 May 2006).  
 
At Getinge they do not think that competitors, in the meaning that they exist, 
affect their capital structure. Hjalmarson says that they focus more on their 
achievements, generally more on their income statement, than on their balance 
sheet. He continues to say that if they feel like, and have the opportunity, they 
acquire other companies, and that fact is a competitive advantage against their 
competitors. Gunnebo does not look at competitors in that aspect; the most 
important thing for them is that they have sound enough finances to maintain their 
business. Furthermore, Olsson thinks that they do not use their own capital 
structure as a competitive advantage, besides that “one has to be a solid company 
to be able to compete on the market” (Olsson 8 May 2006).  Hexagon does not 
look at how their competitors affect their capital structure, neither do they use 
their own capital structure as a competitive advantage, except maybe for the fact 
that their subsidiaries are not allowed to raise debt by themselves. The 
subsidiaries debt is raised centrally by Håkan Halén, and that will possibly give 
them a better bargaining position vis-à-vis their creditors than their competitors, 
says Halén. Almgren thinks that they are aware of how their competitors are 
financed, but they do not think that the choice of capital structure is a solid 
competitive advantage, “everyone can mimic it” (Almgren 2005-05-03).  
 
At Hufvudstaden they do not look at their competitors’ capital structure. They 
also think that due to their own financial stability, especially their real estates, and 
when looking over a longer period of time, they have an ability to do better 
business and thereby have a competitive advantage. JM does some benchmarking 
against their competitors, but Åkesson explains that they conduct such a 
thoroughly analyze of their own business that they do not think that it effects their 
capital structure. On the other hand, their strong balance sheet has worked as a 
competitive advantage against competition, think Åkesson. Lindex mostly look at 
their own figures, but occasionally they can benchmark against their competitors 
to see what capital structure is average for the merchant business, says Andersson.  
But due to their present situation, they do not do that often. They further do not 
use their own capital structure as a competitive advantage, except from the fact 
that they are financially strong, thinks Andersson. If there were to be a general 
decline in the business cycle, then they think that they, due to their non-existing 
leverage, would cope with it better than their competitors, Andersson continues. 
But they do not use it to compete through pricing etcetera.  
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At SCA they do not look at their competitors, they are of minor importance, says 
Rydin. Likewise they do not use their capital structure to compete. Scribona does 
not look at their competitors’ capital structure, and they do not understand how it 
has anything to do with financing decisions, according to Olsén. Neither do they 
use their own capital structure as a competitive advantage. Anders Årling at 
Skanska says that they look very little at competing companies; he describes 
Skanska’s competitive advantage to be their structured business policy, connected 
with their financial ratios and very strong financial recourses. This is a very clear 
competitive advantage, both domestically and internationally, that they 
communicate to their customers, says Årling.  They are uninterested in price 
competition because they do not work in volumes. A key factor to get the 
contracts that Skanska gets is to have the competence and to have endurance as a 
company, there seldom are any competitors that can compete and deliver the kind 
of deals that Skanska can, says Årling. Anders Årling gives an example involving 
a gigantic construction of a bridge, in these situations the customer must know 
that Skanska can first build a complicated project and second that they will exist 
as a company during the whole project. Endurance is something that they 
communicate more than their competitors, Årling sums up.   
 
At SKF they do not consider competition to be of great importance when deciding 
on alterations of the capital structure, but it affects their operative leverage says 
Bertilsson. The degree of competition can worsen, and then also with worsened 
results, and this can, indirectly, affect the capital structure, believes Bertilsson. 
Further he does not believe that SKF uses their own capital structure in that way, 
but a strong financial position is a competitive advantage, through the fact that 
customers strive to do business with stabile and financial strong companies. At 
TietoEnator they think that their competitors’ balance sheets indirectly affect their 
capital structure, they expose their owners to more risk, as long as they are active 
in an industry as homogenous as the one they are in, says Sandberg. Furthermore 
he thinks that they indirectly use their capital structure as a mean to compete, this 
because they have a strong cash flow and a strong balance sheet, which results in 
the ability to make acquisitions continuously. Bo Jacobsson believes that the 
competition for Trelleborg is when they compete about acquisitions, and then it is 
more with private equity competitors than industrial. Private equity competitors, 
due to their much higher leverage possibilities, can be much more aggressive in 
their pricing than Trelleborg, says Jacobsson. Often Trelleborg has synergies with 
their industrial business, but the private equity firms has a much higher leverage, 
but also a higher risk. He also believes that Trelleborg have a somewhat higher 
leverage than the Swedish average, but compared to international actors, they still 
have a very reasonable capital structure. “An optimal capital structure is still a 
competitive advantage towards the ones that do not have one” (Jacobsson 8 May 
2006).  
 
-The Rationale Behind Capital Structure Decisions - Does Theory Explain Practice?- 
 53 
There is a possible indirect affect on their capital structure, thinks Petri at WM-
data. They have discussed it occasionally in the board, but only occasionally, he 
emphases. They do not use their own capital structure as a competitive advantage. 
Company X does not take it into consideration. Neither do they consider the 
second part of the question, except that a strong balance sheet gives them the 
position so that they can act almost as they like. They do not suffer from any 
financial restrictions, which further emphases the last sentence, so from that 
perspective it is a competitive advantage, says Mr. X. 
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5 ANALYSIS 
 
In this fifth section we evaluate the theories based on the information from the 
empery. We will analyze each theory against the complete empery material, 
respectively. Furthermore we will examine if the empery can explain some of the 
five theories and if there are patterns that will help us in answer our question. 
 
 
 
5.1 The Trade-Off Theory Perspective 
 
In order for the trade-off theory to be applicable firms must have an optimal 
capital structure target, or at least a target ratio (Ogden et al 2002). Almost four 
fifths of the companies we have observed shows evidence of having an optimal 
capital structure target. This is in accordance with the results from the study by 
Ghosh and Cai (1999) where they showed that almost all of their examined 
companies, in all industries, had an optimal capital structure target. The majority 
of the companies do not look at capital structure as an explicit measurement; 
rather they use measures that they consider better reveal their current financial 
position, as certain solidity ratios and net debt over EBITDA, measures that 
CRA:s uses in there evaluation of companies. 
 
The fact that not one of the CFO:s or Executives mentioned tax benefit of debt or 
the value of the tax shields when talking about their leverage, is something that 
strongly speaks against the trade-off theory. This is however also in accordance 
with the survey by Graham and Harvey (2001), where they found that the CFO:s 
consideration of the tax benefit of debt only is marginally important when 
deciding on capital structure. This is remarkable for several reasons, the main 
being that the value of the tax benefit of debt is on average 9.7 percent of firm 
value (ibid.). The simple logic behind the trade-off theory is finding the 
equilibrium between the marginal tax benefit of debt and the cost of financial 
future distress (Ogden et al 2002). When one of the factors, in this case the tax 
benefit of debt, is not factored into the equation, the empirical evidence in favour 
of the trade-off theory drastically lessens. 
 
What we have seen is that the companies’ opinion of optimal capital structure 
differs among the companies, which is in accordance with the results from a study 
of Ogden et al (2002), showing that for every firm there exist an optimal capital 
structure, and that it differs across firms. 
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The study by Graham and Harvey (2001) implies that firms will issue foreign debt 
when the foreign tax treatment is more favourable than the domestic, is not what 
we can deduct from the answers in the interviews. Our survey rather supports the 
report made by Brouen et al, (2006), were they show tha t issuing foreign debt in 
response to tax benefits is of minor importance. Instead the reason for raising 
foreign debt seams to be rather that the domestic market does not contain enough 
money that the companies need, or that they want to create a sort of hedge against 
exchange rate risks from the cash flows yielded from foreign assets. Some say that 
the international credit market is more effective, some say that is not.  
 
Approximately half of the companies stated that they take the manoeuvrability of 
the management into consideration when altering their capital structure. We did 
however not find anything that confirms the modulation by Jung, Kim and Stultz 
(1996) that focuses on agency cost of debt and the disciplining role of debt for 
managers. It seems as though the CFO:s, if they take the managers 
manoeuvrability into consideration, they use internal regulations, such as approval 
from the BoD, instead of debt to prevent the managers from value destroying 
activities towards the owners. The impression we got is that they interpreted the 
question so that they will act in favour of the management in order for them to 
gain more flexibility. They are more focused on the importance of a strong 
balance sheet than restrictive actions towards the management. This further 
emphases the fact that they do not consider the leverage decision as being a way 
to protect corporate value.   
 
When it comes to financing decisions it is hard to see any real connection to the 
trade-off theory, many of the companies that does not have a large cash position 
are forced to use debt, and lastly they will chose equity, evidence supporting the 
pecking order model (Myers & Majluf 1984) rather than the trade-off theory. 
Only a limited number of our companies are concerned with how the financing of 
the investment or acquisition affect their capital structure, which is remarkable 
when the majority actually have an optimal capital structure target or target ratio.  
 
Approximately one third of the companies which explicitly or implicitly stated 
that they had an optimal leverage ratio, mentioned risk profile as a concern when 
changing their leverage, and one respondent mentioned cost of financial distress. 
This is in line with what Graham and Harvey (2001) found in their study, where 
they found that managers were concerned about credit ratings. This finding is also 
in line with the trade-off theory, with regards to the firms considering financial 
distress costs. Not one of the managers do however mention the financial distress 
costs as an important factor when altering their capital structure, the credit rating 
issue is more of a general consideration throughout the companies. And a majority 
does not mention them at all. 
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Furthermore, approximately 35 percent of the companies that had an optimal 
capital structure ratio said that the target was set due to restrictive covenants from 
their creditors. It is worth noticing that covenants are the final security limit for 
these companies, they can of course have internal governance systems that guide 
their action within the limit range. 
  
Explicitly we can not say that the majority of the companies do not consider 
financial distress, because many respondents describe that they use earnings and 
cash flow based numbers to measure their financial status. This can possibly be 
seen as a way to be observant of the signs of the first stage of financial distress, 
which is when cash flows from the firm are not sufficient to fulfil its obligations 
(Ogden et al, 2002). 
 
Many of the managers also speak of their strong balance sheet as a way of doing 
business and that it is a competitive advantage due to the fact that customers 
prefer to do business with financially stable companies. This can be interpreted as 
the firms’ awareness of deadweight costs; not by its actual name but it still has the 
same pattern. What it does not have is the reasoning about the loss of the value of 
the tax shield (ibid.). 
 
Despite that many of the interviewed CFO:s does not think that they have an 
optimal target range or optimal capital structure, their answers point in the 
opposite direction. When the managers describe their reasons for paying 
dividends, repurchasing shares etcetera, more than a few state that they make 
these adjustments in order to maintain their capital structure. Furthermore, 
approximately two fifths of the companies consider their investors’ tax situation 
when adjusting their leverage and deciding on how they shall distribute means to 
investors, something that could be interpreted as signs pointing in the direction of 
the Miller equilibrium.  
 
In summary, what is revealed in this survey with regards to the trade-off theory is 
that a majority of the respondents do not recognize all of the issues underlying the 
theory; we do however find empirical evidence both for and against the theory. 
Approximately 80 percent of the companies have some kind of optimal capital 
structure target, or at least a target ratio. Not one of the companies seems to 
consider the tax benefit of debt or the value of the tax shield, or even mentions 
anything that points in that direction. We found that the companies do not issue 
foreign debt in order to benefit from favourable tax treatment. Awareness of 
financial distress is evident; though the factor is of minor importance when 
determining capital structure. 
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5.2 The Pecking Order Perspective 
 
When deciding on if to take on new debt, the most important consideration is the 
price of the debt, which in the case of the respondents seem to be the interest rate. 
One thing that speaks in favour of the pecking order model here is that several 
respondents say that they raise debt when their cash position is not sufficient, or 
answer that they do not raise debt because they have enough cash to do business. 
 
One of the theoretical underpinnings of the pecking order model is that for the 
model to work, the firm cannot have target ratio for its capital structure (Ogden et 
al, 2002).  This is because the financing hierarchy will determine the capital 
structure when new financing is needed. This means that our finding that four 
fifths of the respondents have some sort of optimal capital structure target ratio 
speaks to the models disadvantage. However, as Quan (2002) suggests, a target 
ratio does not necessarily have to discredit the pecking order model altogether. As 
we will see further down in the analysis, this is to be observed in the empirical 
data of this study. Also, the fact that four fifths have a target ratio is something we 
learned from the deeper discussions with the respondent, far less actually 
answered that they had a target. Many of the interviewed companies said that they 
do not have an optimal target, but obey by the guidelines issued by the CRA:s to 
fit their desired rating, which effectively is more or less the same thing. It is also 
evident that most of the interviewees in the companies with stated capital structure 
targets simply look at the income statement when deciding on financing. This is 
because they seem to consider debt more costly than equity. No matter how you 
reason, this means that they do not consider any costs besides the actual interest 
rate, and that clearly speaks against the pecking order model. There is however 
other examples, when the respondents consider equity to be much more costly 
than debt, so we can not say that the model falls with this reasoning, almost half 
of the interviewees seem to consider not just the explicit costs, and that speaks for 
the pecking order model. Furthermore, some of the respondents say that they have 
ceilings for their leverage, but below that, they do not have an optimal point. This 
leaves room for a financial ordering based on the total cost of the mean, including 
informational asymmetry costs. 
 
When it comes to the firms’ financing, just over half of the respondents say that 
they prefer to finance new projects with cash. With larger projects, almost all 
finances with some sort of debt. Only in cases when the leverage is too high do 
they turn to equity financing. These results speak strongly in favour of the 
financing hierarchy of the pecking order model. It is not clear from an initial look 
what the reasons for this ordering are. The reasons seem to vary. Some say that 
they tailor their financing to fit their capital structure and current leverage. There 
are however examples of respondents discussing the relative costs of financing 
-The Rationale Behind Capital Structure Decisions - Does Theory Explain Practice?- 
 58 
sources as a hierarchy that fits the model. Since most of the respondents claim to 
have very strong balance sheets at the moment, this can then be an explanation for 
the overwhelming support for cash and debt financing. Maybe the answers would 
have been different in times when their leverage was higher. Some say however 
that they prefer to use cash as far as possible, due to its easy accessibility. This 
flexibility argument is one that also favours the pecking order model. The fact that 
the ordering may be determined by the companies’ current leverage speaks 
against. What further speak against the model is that no company seems to have 
any problems with turning to the stock market when needing to raise financing. 
 
When discussing dividends and equity issues, it is clear that most respondents 
prefer to have some financial slack, and would rather keep cash in the company 
for future investments than to pay it out to the owners or the creditors. This is 
perfectly in line with the reasoning in the pecking order model. Some do this more 
just in case they will find interesting investments; some companies have some sort 
of liquidity measure. In both cases, we interpret that as a way to mitigate any 
potential underinvestment problems or in line with the fundamentals of the model 
in any case. Almost half of the respondents mention that the investment decision 
comes before the financing decision, that is, the financing is contingent on 
attractive investment opportunities. This is something that the model does not 
recognise, and therefore has no explanation within the pecking order model.  
 
The question of management’s flexibility in being able to make decisions is one 
of the most important factors underlying the pecking order model. Even though 
most of the respondents say that it is important with flexibility, thus strengthening 
the pecking order explanation, the most important factor seems to be the actual 
investments that the company needs the flexibility to finance. There seems to be a 
strong belief that management always makes the right choice for the company and 
its owners, it is almost assumed in the respondents’ answers. There is however an 
overwhelming support that cash is more flexible than debt, which is in turn more 
flexible than equity, also in line with the financing hierarchy of the pecking order 
model. Furthermore, the respondents seem to view the restrictions on flexibility to 
come from decisions that has to go through a finance committee or the BoD, 
rather than relative cost of financing alternative. The companies do however aim 
for the most flexibility when the decision has been approved by the BoD or 
committee. The financial slack for flexibility, as coherent with the pecking order 
model, is also sometimes in some companies used as a cushion for future costs of 
financial distress, so the financial slack can speak both for and against the model, 
depending on the underlying reason for keeping it. 
 
In summary, the thing in the interviews that mostly speaks against the pecking 
order model is the fact that most respondents have some sort of optimal leverage 
ratio that they try to adjust to in the long run, something that is irreconcilable with 
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the rationale that the relative financing cost decides the capital structure. Another 
thing is that the investment decision often comes before the financing decision, 
and is governed by it, something that the model does not treat. The strongest 
evidence for the pecking order model we found is that almost all companies 
adhere to the financing hierarchy. However, he reason for this may not be the 
relative costs of informational asymmetries, as the theories state. Another support 
for the model is that firms prefer to keep some financial slack, and consider their 
flexibility to be of great importance, something that is in line with the model. 
 
 
5.3 The Signalling Model Perspective 
 
To start with we must recognise, based on the interviews we have conducted, that 
there seems to be a widespread misunderstanding regarding how the term 
signalling is understood by the respondents. Actually, about 15 percent of the 
interviewees had not heard the term signalling. This in turn begs the question if 
the others knew the term, or gave us general answers on what they thought it 
meant. The risk here is that they have answered not the actual question, but their 
understanding of it. In retrospect we have concluded that it would have been more 
appropriate to talk about communication rather that signalling with the 
respondents. The reader is hereby advised to have this in mind when reading the 
analysis. 
 
According to our results, only one tenth of the respondents say that they use their 
capital structure as a signalling tool. A tendency that we have seen is that the 
companies, rather than using their leverage as a mean of signa lling, signals their 
financial strength and true value through bottom line measurements such as net 
debt to EBITDA. No matter what the interviewees actually respond, we found 
patterns here that at least partially support the signalling theories. 
 
Nearly four fifths of the respondents finance new projects and acquisitions 
through internal cash or retained earnings. These results are in accordance with 
the study by Leland and Pyle (1977), and their findings on how a company can 
signal its true value. By financing projects and investments with retained earnings 
the companies stand to lose its own capital. The fact that they are willing to bear 
this risk speaks to the fact that they strongly believe in the investment, and that is 
then also the signal that they will send to their stakeholders. 
 
Approximately one third of the firms repurchase equity, and they do this at times 
when they feel their leverage is too low. This is in line with Miller and Rock 
(1985), who concludes that the ability to repurchase or pay dividends is a way to 
signal the firms’ strong financial standing.  
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A promise to continuously pay dividends signals that the company will have a 
strong enough cash flow to uphold the yearly payouts. Almost all companies in 
the study pay yearly dividends, with the exception of one, who responds that they 
do not have a strong enough bottom line to finance dividends. This is also in 
accordance with Miller and Rock (1985), and their theories on signalling through 
dividends and repurchases.  
 
There is a possibility though for bad firms to mimic the actions of good ones and 
their dividend policy thereby signalling a false value that is higher than the actual. 
This can be mitigated by paying a high enough dividend so that the bad 
companies can not afford to mimic them (Bhattacharya 1979). This is however 
hard for us to distinguish, and we can therefore not judge the fairness in each 
companies dividend level. 
 
Furthermore, nearly half of the respondents say that they look at restrictive 
covenants and the evaluations by CRA:s when they set their capital structure. This 
can be interpreted in line with the signalling reasoning, as a sound company can 
adhere to strict covenants, and a worse can not. 
 
 
5.4 The Product-Market Competition Perspective 
 
Regarding the interviewed financial executives’ views on if they use their 
companies’ capital structure for competitive purposes, about two fifths said that 
they do not do that. Furthermore, one fourth of these respondents could not see the 
relevance in the question, and added that capital structure could not be used in 
such a way. This possible speaks against McGee and Telser, who argued that 
companies do use their capital structures as means of competition (Poitevin 1989). 
 
The other three fifths argued that they do use it for competitive purposes in some 
sense, mainly through having sound finances and a strong balance sheet. This is 
possibly a factor that can support the product-market competition models, that a 
company with a strong balance sheet, and a high degree of internal financing, is 
more flexible, and therefore more adept to competition. 
 
A few of the interviewees argue that they through their low leverage better could  
handle a cyclical downturn than their competition. This is in line with Poitevin’s 
(1989) findings that companies with high leverage are more sensitive to cyclical 
downturns and therefore worse of in terms of competitive position. We do 
however not find any evidence that the companies use their lower leverage to 
compete with their competitors, even though this may be the case in worse times. 
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It is hard to draw the analysis deeper than that at this point without too much 
subjective reasoning. This is because the theories presuppose a more thorough 
analysis of the competitive situation in and between all companies and their 
industries. It is therefore also difficult to show if established companies push out 
new entrants from industries. 
 
Approximately half of the respondents did not have any opinion on how and if 
competition was mirrored in their capital structure. Around one fifth said that it 
did not affect their capital structure at all, and one fourth of these did not think 
that they had any real competition within their industry. The rest of the 
interviewees said that competition had affect on their capital structure, but were 
rather vague on how, and for different reasons.  
 
Through the question on the flexibility of the management we found that half of 
the companies weighed in the management’s ability to do business, its general 
flexibility and in some ins tances the presence of means when making capital 
structure decisions. This, in combination with the fact that most companies in this 
study finance their investment and projects through internal means, are in line 
with the reasoning behind product-market competition models.  
 
 
5.5 The Market Timing Perspective 
 
Not one of the respondents says that they finance new investments and projects 
through equity issues if they are overvalued in the market. This is rather 
remarkable and contradictory to the findings of Lucas and McDonald (1990) who 
concludes that companies aided by private information, issue equity when they 
feel that they are overvalued in the market. 
 
Five percent of the companies say that the repurchase when they are overvalued. 
This also speaks aga inst the market timing hypothesis, which states that is should 
be the other way around, that is, repurchases are maid when the firms feels that its 
shares are valued too low in the market. This is also what common sense leads us 
to believe. One third of the respondents do however state that they repurchase, but 
not because they want to time a low valuation in the market, but because they 
want to adjust their capital structure. This reasoning is however nothing we will 
connect to the theory due to its logical inconsistency, but we add it to the 
discussion because it is very much worth noticing. 
 
When the interviewees take on new loans, around 60 percent state that the price of 
debt and the total borrowing cost is the most important factor. This means that for 
them, the market conditions are the most important consideration through how 
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high the interest rates are at the moment. This is in line with the market timing 
hypothesis, that a company takes on new loans when the timing is most 
favourable. This conclusion is however very naïve, because it should be obvious 
that a firm chooses to take on new debt when debt is least costly. One of the 
respondents said that his company tried to time the market, in the sense that they 
choose the financing based on what is most favourable at the time, debt or equity. 
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6 DISCUSSION 
 
In the sixth section of the thesis we will present our findings from the analysis and 
discuss what is the purpose of this study, namely what reasoning lies behind the 
capital structure decisions in firms. 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Initial Findings 
 
The first thing we notice when analysing the answers through the different 
theoretical perspectives is that none of the theories explain capital structure 
decisions. There are of course some pieces of the theories that fit some part of the 
interviewees’ answers, but then there are even more that does not fit. If you look 
at the different theories, you will soon see a pattern evolving. All theories claim to 
explain capital structure decisions making, and if used as a guidebook on how to 
set an optimal capital structure, they probably will. But herein lays the 
fundamental flaw with the five prevailing theories we have covered. They are 
normative in nature. Each theory claim to have found the key that opens the secret 
of creating the best possible capital structure in any given situation. But they do 
not explain why companies make capital structure decisions in the way that they 
do, at least not completely. 
 
There are however a lot of useful information and concepts in the theories. 
Companies think about cost of future financial distress in some way, they consider 
internal means to provide flexibility they try to take on debt when interest rates 
are down, they use their strong balance sheets to convey reliability to its 
stakeholders, and in adverse times they can use a strong capital structure for 
competitive purposes. All theories fit, but there are two fundamental flaws with 
this theoretical fit. The first is that only parts of the theories are used and proven, 
and the second is that the theories do still not explain why the capital structure 
decisions are made in the manner they are. We therefore conclude that the key to 
understanding what lays behind capital structure decisions is to use the parts of 
the theories that do fit in conjunction with the interviewees’ answers and 
determine a set of factors that are common to most respondents, because this was 
also a problem. When we concluded our analyses we had a lot of information left, 
a lot of answers that did not fit any of the theories. According to us, this 
information is part of the key to answering our questions, along with the theories. 
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For the above stated reasons, we have constructed a set of hypotheses, based on 
the analyses in the previous chapter and the empirical material. For each 
hypothesis, we provide reasons and rationales. The hypotheses will be rather 
general in nature, and tests have to be constructed for each hypothesis separately. 
For the hypotheses that critique the theories, we have chosen to go into rather 
great detail. This renders a large number of sub-hypotheses to the main theory-
critiquing hypothesis, and can seem overzealous to the reader. We have opted to 
do this anyway, because it highlights the shortcomings of the theories’ ability to 
explain practice. Another reason is that the vast theoretical portion of this thesis 
enables and compels us to state all these hypotheses. 
 
 
6.1.1 Hypothesis 1: “The capital structure theories are 
too normative, and do not accurately reflect how 
capital structure decisions are made in companies” 
 
As we stated in the beginning of this chapter, the theories’ major concern is how a 
company optimally should choose its target capital structure. Even before making 
an analysis of discussing our findings, we can conclude that five different and 
sometimes mutually exclusive theories can not accomplish this. Our conclusion is 
therefore that no single theory does this. 
 
As we can observe from the interviewees responses to our questions, there is not 
one manager who follows one of the theories presented in our paper. Bits and 
pieces of the theories fit the factors that the managers describe as being important 
when making capital structure decisions, but they do not explain the choices fully, 
nor do they address the underlying reasoning behind the choices. This does not 
mean that there is no use for the theories, but it does mean that they fit practice so 
poorly so that they according to us do not say much about how decisions are made 
in companies. 
 
 
6.1.2 Hypothesis 2: “The capital structure theories 
address mere factors in capital structure decisions, 
and not the actual reasoning behind these factors” 
 
The shortcomings of the theories explaining the reasoning is best expressed 
through examples of when theory does not match practice, and when theory can 
be outright misleading. This hypothesis is therefore broken down into sub-
hypotheses.  
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6.1.2.1 Hypothesis 2a: “Firms do not use their capital structure 
mainly for signalling purposes, the conveyance of 
information is more of a by-product” 
 
If we take the signalling model as an example, the theory state that a company can 
signal its true values through different actions that affects the company’s capital 
structure. If a company feels that it is overvalued in the market, it can issue new 
equity, and this will convey the information to the stock market. Even though our 
respondents say that they issue equity under favourable conditions, the reason is 
that it is favourable to do so at that point in time, not that they whish their share 
price to fall. The subtle difference here is that even though the issue might be 
interpreted by the market as overvaluation, and the response will be a lowered 
price, the rational behind the actual decisions is slightly another. The theory does 
therefore explain what happens in the market, and how the signal is interpreted, 
but not why the capital structure decisions is made. This hypothesis of course 
favours the market timing hypothesis over the signalling model. 
 
 
6.1.2.2 Hypothesis 2b: “Companies do try to time the market, but 
the capital structure is not explained by market timing” 
 
As we brought forward in the previous hypothesis, companies issue equity and 
debt when the market conditions are the most favourable. There are however 
several factors that limit the amount of debt and equity the companies can take on, 
such as covenants and credit ratings, but also the decision to take on new 
financing is not governed by market conditions. A company will not take on debt 
just because the interest rate is low, or issue equity because the market conditions 
are more favourable at that point in time. At least not in the companies we have 
surveyed. The investment decision comes first, and then most of the companies 
use internal means or existing lines of credit. First thereafter can the decision to 
take on alternate financing be discussed. 
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6.1.2.3 Hypothesis 2c: “The financing hierarchy costs in the 
pecking-order model is not based on relative costs of 
informational asymmetries” 
 
Another example is from the financial hierarchy in the pecking-order model. From 
our interviews we can safely conclude that the hierarchy as an order holds. 
Managers consider internal means to be cheaper and easier to use than external, 
and debt to be cheaper and easier to use as financing than equity. The theory, 
however, states that the reason for the cost differences is the degree of 
informational asymmetry in the financing source. This is something that the 
interviewed managers do not consider. They instead think of the costs in terms of 
hurdle rates that they have to pay to the stakeholders, that include both the interest 
rate costs, dividends, and one-time costs for facilitating the financing. 
 
 
6.1.2.4 Hypothesis 2d: “Companies are concerned very little or 
not at all with tax benefits of debt when deciding on 
altering their capital structure” 
 
According to us, this is one of the more remarkable findings in this survey. We do 
not say that tax benefits of debt is not important in companies, but since we are 
interested in reasoning and rationale, we have to state this hypothesis, since not 
one of the financial executives we interviewed mentioned this at any point in the 
interview. If it is so, and tax benefit of debt is weighed in elsewhere in the 
company than in the capital structure decisions, the entire theoretical base for the 
traditional trade-off theory disappears. We are however not willing to go so far as 
to deem the theory useless, but instead leave it up to future tests to examine the 
hypothesis. 
 
 
6.1.2.5 Hypothesis 2e: “Companies do not intentionally use their 
capital structure as a mean to compete” 
 
Almost all of the respondents say that they do not use their capital structure for 
competitive or predatory actions, and many have never thought about it. The ones 
who do state that they do it seem to think of a strong balance sheet as a deterrent 
for the competition, rather than direct competition. We argue that the answers 
might have been slightly different if we had conducted this study in a downturn in 
the economy, maybe then companies with very low leverage would engage in 
predatory actions, but they do not consider that now, and they state that if they do 
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have a strong balance sheet, it will enable them to prevail in a downturn, not pray 
on the competition. Since it once again is the reasoning behind capital structure 
decisions we are interested in, we must conclude that from this perspective and in 
today’s market, the theory fails to explain why capital structure decisions are 
made, and what it results in. 
 
 
6.1.2.6 Hypothesis 2f: “Companies do take on foreign debt, but 
not because tax conditions are favourable” 
 
When asked if they take on foreign debt, many of the managers answer yes. This 
is however not for the tax benefit reason that the theory states, but for several 
other reasons. Some say that the take on foreign debt for hedging purposes, some 
to match assets, and still some because they use it for strategic business purposes. 
Some also do it because the Swedish credit market is too small for their financing 
needs. A few respondents state that they take on foreign debt because the interest 
rates are lower. The violation of international interest rate parity would be 
interesting to explore, but we have chosen not to do that in this thesis. 
 
 
6.1.2.7 Hypothesis 2g: “The managers’ manoeuvrability is not 
limited through capital structure decisions” 
 
The respondents state that they are concerned with the flexibility and 
manoeuvrability of the management, but they do not use the capital structure to 
limit and control it. Instead, they either have to take large investments through the 
BoD or through a financing committee for approval. The headroom is therefore 
unaffected by the capital structure, and more debt will not further limit the 
managers’ flexibility. 
 
 
6.1.2.8 Hypothesis 2h: “Companies consider their investors’ tax 
situation, but do not cater to different investor groups” 
 
When paying dividends or repurchasing shares, the companies consider their 
investors tax rates, but they do not think about what investor groups to target with 
different types of securities. Instead they consider it in the context of what is the 
most tax beneficial way to distribute money to the investors. Because of the ex 
post nature of this, it is not really a capital structure decision, and therefore not 
relevant as a capital structure theory. 
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6.1.3 Hypothesis 3: “When choosing a target capital 
structure, companies are concerned with 
covenants” 
 
This hypothesis comes from our discussions with the respondents and from the 
financial distress cost thinking in the traditional trade-off theory. There is also the 
question of optimality, which prevails through these considerations. When asked 
if there exist target capital structure ratios within the firms, many managers 
answer that they do not reason that way anymore. They instead say that the 
leverage is too high when the covenants say it is. There is a maximum limit, and 
the question of levering up therefore becomes obsolete above this limit. 
 
 
6.1.4 Hypothesis 4: “When choosing a target capital 
structure, companies are concerned with credit 
ratings and cash-flow measures” 
 
The managers furthermore state that they are less concerned with the traditional 
debt to equity measure and more concerned with cash-flow based measures. The 
reason behind this is that these are the measures that credit rating agencies look at 
when determining the companies’ credit rating. And credit rating seems to be the 
thing that companies’ look at and tries to benchmark against. This is therefore the 
reason behind many of the capital structure decisions made in companies today. 
The ultimate rationale is to provide a stable company that minimises the interest 
rates and becomes attractive to investors. 
 
 
6.1.5 Hypothesis 5: “Interest rates are important when 
companies decide to take on new debt” 
 
Almost all of the respondents state that interest rates and the conditions for the 
rates are the most important factor when deciding on if to finance with debt or not. 
This specific cost is not directly mirrored in any of the theories, but seems to be 
very important when companies make capital structure decisions. 
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6.1.6 Hypothesis 6: “Strategic considerations are 
important when taking on new financing” 
 
Many of the respondents say that they want the capital structure to fit the strategy. 
They want to be able to fulfil the strategy and the projects that they have taken on, 
and therefore have access to as much capital as they think that they will need to 
support the strategic direction or project at conception. 
 
 
6.1.7 Hypothesis 7: “The choice of financing, and 
therefore capital structure, follows the investment 
decision” 
 
Many of the interviewees say that they firstly decide on an investment, and then 
decide on the mean of financing. The financing then depends on if it is a large or 
small investment, what the interest rates are at the moment, and how much cash 
the company has internally. Should it be an interesting enough investment, many 
respondents state they do not have any problems with turning to the stock market 
for money in an equity issue. 
 
 
6.1.8 Hypothesis 8: “When choosing a capital structure, 
companies are concerned with flexibility” 
 
This hypothesis has already been analysed somewhat, but it is such an important 
one that it has to stand on its own as well. Both the flexibility of the management 
to make decisions and the flexibility of the entire company to be able to fulfil its 
strategy and started projects are very important considerations when making 
capital structure decisions. That is why companies try to maintain financial slack 
and have credit arrangements made in advance. 
 
These nine hypotheses are the ones that we deem to be the most important ones. 
There are others that could be deducted from the empirical material, but mostly 
ones that are in line with the reasoning of the ones already stated. In the next 
section, we will briefly summarise these conclusions answer the question on what 
lies behind capital structure decisions, and to see how well the prevailing theories 
fit the answers. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this the seventh and final chapter, we will present our conclusions.  
 
 
 
 
From our analysis and discussion we can clearly see that the theories fit practice 
rather poorly. Although some points are made by each and every theory, the most 
parts of the theories state normative factors that do not accurately describe how 
capital structure decisions are made. We have arrived in a number of hypotheses 
and sub-hypotheses, which are explained in the last section. These hypotheses 
provide the answers to our questions and purpose. More precisely, they answer 
the question on what lies behind capital structure decisions, and how well the 
prevailing theories fit the answers. The hypotheses are: 
 
Hypothesis 1: “The capital structure theories are too normative, and do not 
accurately reflect how capital structure decisions are made in companies” 
 
Hypothesis 2: “The capital structure theories address mere factors in capital 
structure decisions, and not the actual reasoning behind these factors” 
 
Hypothesis 2a: “Firms do not use their capital structure mainly for signalling 
purposes, the conveyance of information is more of a by-product” 
 
Hypothesis 2b: “Companies do try to time the market, but the capital structure is 
not explained by market timing” 
 
Hypothesis 2c: “The financing hierarchy costs in the pecking-order model is not 
based on relative costs of informational asymmetries” 
 
Hypothesis 2d: “Companies are concerned very little or not at all with tax benefits 
of debt when deciding on altering their capital structure” 
 
Hypothesis 2e: “Companies do not intentionally use their capital structure as a 
mean to compete” 
 
Hypothesis 2f: “Companies do take on foreign debt, but not because tax 
conditions are favourable” 
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Hypothesis 2g: “The managers’ manoeuvrability is not limited through capital 
structure decisions” 
 
Hypothesis 2h: “Companies consider their investors’ tax situation, but do not cater 
to different investor groups  
 
Hypothesis 3: “When choosing a target capital structure, companies are concerned 
with covenants” 
 
Hypothesis 4: “When choosing a target capital structure, companies are concerned 
with credit ratings and cash-flow measures” 
 
Hypothesis 5: “Interest rates are important when companies decide to take on new 
debt” 
 
Hypothesis 6: “Strategic considerations are important when taking on new 
financing” 
 
Hypothesis 7: “The choice of financing, and therefore capital structure, follows 
the investment decision” 
 
Hypothesis 8: “When choosing a capital structure, companies are concerned with 
flexibility” 
 
It would be very interesting to see further tests on these hypotheses, either 
combined or separately, and hope that they will contribute to the evolution of the 
research field in capital structure decisions from a normative one to an explaining 
one. 
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Appendix – Interview Questions 
 
1. What is the most important consideration when you decide to take in new 
debt in your company? 
2. Do you raise debt abroad? 
3. Does your company have an optimal leverage ratio and if they do, when is 
it too high? 
4. How do you finance new projects and acquisitions?  
5. When do you issue equity / repurchase stock, or pay out dividend? 
6. Do you take your investors’ tax rate into consideration when changing the 
capital structure? 
7. Does your company use their capital structure or leverage ratio for 
signalling purposes? 
8. Do you consider the management’s flexibility when changing the leverage 
ratio within your company? 
9. How does competition affect your capital structure and do you use your 
capital structure as a competitive advantage? 
 
 
 
 
